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Attacks on computer systems continue to be a problem. The majority of the attacks target home
computer users. To help mitigate the attacks some companies provide security awareness
training to their employees. However, not all people work for a company that provides security
awareness training and typically, home computer users do not have the incentive to take security
awareness training on their own. Research in security awareness and security behavior has
produced conflicting results. Therefore, it is not clear, how security aware home computer users
are or to what extent security awareness affects the security behavior of home computer users.
The goal of this study was to determine if there is a relationship between security awareness and
users practicing good security behavior.
This study adapted its research model from the health belief model (HBM), which accesses a
patient’s decision to perform health related activities. The research model included the HBM
constructs of perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, perceived threat, perceived benefits,
perceived barriers, cues to action, and self-efficacy. The research model also contained the
security awareness (SA) and concern for information privacy (CFIP) constructs. The model used
SA to ascertain the effect of security awareness on a person’s self-efficacy in information
security (SEIS), perceived threat, CFIP, and security behavior. The research model included
CFIP to ascertain its effect on security behavior.
The developed survey measured the participants' security awareness, concern for information
privacy, self-efficacy, expectations of security actions, perceived security threats, cues to action,
and security behavior. SurveyMonkey administered the survey. SurveyMonkey randomly
selected 267 participants from its 30 million-member base.
The findings of this study indicate home computer users are security aware. SA does not have a
direct effect on a user’s security behavior, perceived threat, or CFIP. However, it does have
influence on SEIS. SEIS has a weak effect on expectations. CFIP has an effect on a user’s
security behavior after removing perceived threat from the research model. Perceived
susceptibility has a direct effect on a user’s security behavior, but perceived severity or perceived
threat does not.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
Attacks on computer systems continue to be a problem. The Anti-Phishing Working
Group (2015) reported 197,252 unique phishing attacks for the fourth quarter 2014.
Phishing is a method, used by criminals, employing a combination malware and social
engineering techniques to steal computer users’ personal information. The United States
hosts more phishing sites than any other country (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2015,
April).
In 2007 95% of the attacks targeted home computer users (Symantec, 2007,
September). In 2014-2015 80% of the zero-day attacks exploited software used by PC
users (McAfee, 2015). Ransomware grew 58% in the second quarter of 2015 (McAfee,
2015, August). Ransomware is software that prevents the owner of a computer from
using the computer, typically by encrypting the computer’s hard drive. Once the
ransomware executes on the computer, the attacker demands payment from the owner to
decrypt the computer’s hard drive. Home computer users need to be aware of these
attacks and learn how to protect themselves from them (Kritzinger & von Solms, 2010).
Much of the malware designed today use social engineering techniques to trick the
unwary or security unaware user in giving up personal or company confidential
information (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2011). Social engineering is “the practice of
using deception or persuasion to fraudulently obtain goods or information, and the term is
often used in relation to computer systems or the information they contain” (Twitchell,
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2006, p. 191). Using social engineering techniques allows the attackers to bypass the
technical safeguards put in place by security software. This enables the attackers to
acquire the information directly from the employees or the home computer user (Carroll,
2006).
Home computer users need to be aware of the types of malicious attacks targeted at
them. They also need to know how to defend against the attacks. However, it is unclear
how aware users are to all of the potential threats they face or if security awareness
influences their security behavior. For the purposes of this study security awareness is
defined as having knowledge of good security practices and knowing the importance of
protecting personal and/or corporate data residing on the computers that a person
accesses. A security aware person will understand the types of attacks used against
computer systems and have knowledge of the techniques used to counteract those attacks.
Good security behavior is activities used to help protect personal and/or corporate data
and the computers where the data resides. These activities protect computers and the
people who use the computers from attacks, such as password thief, viruses, worms,
Trojan horses, phishing, and social engineering. Good security practices include but are
not limited to using good password practices, using anti-virus software, using firewalls,
applying security updates for all software, and guarding against social engineering
attacks.
Researchers have been exploring ways to improve security awareness with
encouraging results (Cone, Irvine, Thompson, & Nguyen, 2007; Maurer, De Luca, &
Kempe, 2011). Preliminary studies indicate that the more security aware a user is the
better the user's security behavior will be (Furnell, Bryant, & Phippen, 2007; Grant, 2010;
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Katz, 2005; North, Perryman, Burns, & North, 2010). Corporations are implementing
security awareness programs to improve the security behavior of their employees (Cone
et al., 2007; Kruger & Kearney, 2006; McCoy & Fowler, 2004). Yet Albrechtsen (2007)
claims security awareness programs have little effect on employees’ security awareness
or security behavior. Workman (2007) states that some people who say they are
concerned about information security and privacy are still willing to give up their privacy
for convenience or divulge personal information for small rewards. In a Norton survey,
68% of the participants were willing to trade private information for a free mobile app
(Symantec, 2015, April). Conlan and Tarasewich (2006) stated that formal user education
does not work well for home computer users.
So are home computer users security-aware? Will security aware home computer
users practice good security behavior? Grant (2010) suggests the need for additional
studies to help answer these questions. Ng, Kankanhalli, and Xu (2009) point out that
many practitioner guidelines for developing security awareness programs exist but few
studies on the design and effectiveness of security awareness programs exist. This study
will attempt to shed some insight on the subject of security awareness and security
behavior using the Health Belief Model (Figure 1). Hochbaum (1958) developed the
Health Belief Model (HBM) to study the behavior of people in health related studies.
Chen et al. (2011) states that:
The HBM assumes that people are likely to exhibit disease prevention behaviors if
they perceive that (a) they are highly susceptible to the disease; (b) the disease is
serious; (c) the behaviors are beneficial; (d) the behaviors have few barriers; and (e)
they are cued to perform the behaviors. (p. 30)
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The HBM consists of eight constructs (Hayden, 2009): perceived severity, perceived
susceptibility, perceived threat, perceived benefits, perceived barriers, cues to action,
self-efficacy, and modifying variables (Table 1).

Perceived
Susceptibility /
Perceived
Seriousness

Demographic
Variables

Perceived Benefits
minus
Perceived Barriers

Perceived Threat

Intent to Take
Action

Cues to Action

Self-efficacy

Figure 1. Health Belief Model.

Table 1. Health Belief Model Constructs

Construct
perceived severity

Description
One's belief of the seriousness
of the health problem.

Reference
Hayden, 2009

perceived
susceptibility

One's belief of the likelihood of
contracting a condition.

Rosenstock, 1966

perceived threat

It is the combination of
perceived severity and
perceived susceptibility.

Glanz, Rimer, & Viswanath,
2008
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perceived benefits

A person's beliefs about the
effectiveness of various courses
of action.

Ng et al., 2009

perceived barriers

A person's belief about the costs
of a course of action.

Glanz et al., 2008

cues to action

Events or people that motivate
people to change their behavior.

Hayden, 2009

self-efficacy

The belief that one can execute
Bandura, 1977
the behavior required to produce
the desired outcome.

modifying variables

Diverse demographic, sociopsychological, and structural
variables - e.g., age, gender,
race, ethnicity, socioeconomic,
experience, and education.

Glanz et al., 2008

Previous researchers have used modified versions of the HBM to study security
behavior (Claar, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng et al., 2009). Ng et al. (2009) used the
HBM to study email related security behavior. Ng et al. (2009) found that perceived
susceptibility, perceived benefits, and self-efficacy were determinants to email security
behavior. Claar (2011) used the HBM to study the adoption of computer security
software in the home computer environment. Claar's (2011) results show that perceived
vulnerability, perceived barriers, and self-efficacy have an influence on computer security
usage. Liang and Xue (2010) used a modified version of the HBM to study personal
computer usage. Liang and Xue (2010) found that perceived threats, perceived barriers,
perceived benefits, and self-efficacy were determinants to personal computer usage
security behavior.
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This research model is adapted from the HBM, here forward called the Security Belief
Model (SBM), to determine if there is a relationship between security awareness and a
person's security behavior. The participants of the study consisted of home computer
users. The study examined the security awareness and security behavior of the users
within the scope of computer social engineering.

Problem Statement
It is not clear whether home computer users are security aware. Nor is it clear what
part security awareness plays in motivating home computer users into practicing good
security behavior. Although home computer users are exposed to security awareness
concepts (Cone et al., 2007; Kruger & Kearney, 2006), home computer users are still
putting themselves at risk by practicing insecure behavior (Rhee, Kim, & Ryu, 2009;
Styles & Tryfonas, 2009). In addition, there is conflicting evidence on whether security
awareness affects a user's motivation to perform good security behavior.

Goal
The goal of this study is to determine if home computer users are security aware and if
there is a relationship between security awareness and home computer users' security
behavior. To accomplish this goal the SBM was developed. The research design made
use of a survey instrument to measure the constructs. A group of adults who use their PCs
to access the Internet on a regular basis participated in the survey. The results of the
survey were analyzed to determine how security aware home computer users are and
determine what motivated the users' security behavior.
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Research Questions
The purpose of this study was to determine how security aware home computer users
are and what role security awareness plays in home computer users' motivation in
practicing good security behavior. This was a quantitative closed-end study based on
previous research in security awareness and security behavior. The research questions
investigated were:
RQ1: Is there a relationship between home computer users’ security-awareness
and security behavior?
RQ2: Is the relationship between security awareness and security behavior
intervened by other factors?

RQ1
Previous research seems to indicate that increased security awareness encourages
users to perform good security behavior (Furnell et al., 2007; Grant, 2010; Katz, 2005;
North et al., 2010). Although corporations are implementing security awareness programs
(Cone et al., 2007; Kruger & Kearney, 2006; McCoy & Fowler, 2004), Albrechtsen
(2007) claims the security awareness programs have little effect on security awareness or
security behavior. Researchers have found that some people are still willing to give up
their privacy for convenience or for small rewards (Symantec, 2015, April; Workman,
2007).
Computer security behavior is similar to health related preventative behavior (Claar,
2011) prompting several researchers to use the HBM when studying factors that affect
the acceptance of protective technologies (Claar, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng et al.,
2009). The research model for this study is based on the HBM. The SBM includes the
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security awareness construct to test its effects on other constructs in the model. A survey
based on the constructs in the SBM was developed. The results of the study's survey was
used to determine what effect security awareness has on a person's security behavior.

RQ2
D’Arcy, Hovav, and Galletta (2009) found that the employees' awareness of security
policies had an effect on the employees' perceived certainty of sanctions, which is a
similar construct to the HBM’s perceived susceptibility. Furthermore D'Arcy et al. (2009)
found that the employees' awareness of security policies had an effect on the employees'
perceived severity of sanctions, which is a construct similar to the HBM’s perceived
severity. Rhee et al. (2009) found that users who believed they had access to technology
needed to control security threats had greater security self-efficacy than users who did
not. Al Abri, McGill, and Dixon (2009) found that privacy awareness had an influence on
users' privacy risk concerns.
The study investigated whether security awareness is intervened by other variables.
The variables under investigation were self-efficacy, expectations, concern for
information privacy, and perceived security threat constructs of the SBM. The survey
data was analyzed to determine whether any relationships existed between security
awareness and other constructs in the SBM.

Relevance and Significance
Attacks on corporate computer systems and home computer users continue to be a
problem. Symantec (2015, April) reported that in 2014 317 million new pieces of
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malware created. Ransomware attacks grew 113 percent in 2014 (Symantec 2015, April).
The Anti-Phishing Working Group (2015) detected an average of 255,000 malware
variants each day in the fourth quarter of 2014. In 2014, attackers exposed 348 million
identities Symantec (2015, April). In 2014, malicious bots infected 1.9 million PCs
(Symantec 2015, April). A bot is an automated program that runs over the Internet. A
malicious bot will infect a PC with malware, execute denial of service attacks, create
spam servers, steal email addresses, or steal CPU cycles from the targeted PC.
Attacks are technical and non-technical in nature so corporations and home computer
users should employ a defense in depth philosophy to security. Defense in depth is "the
practice of applying multiple layers of security protection between an information
resource and a potential attacker." (Tipton, 2010, Kindle Locations 500-502). Although
any good defense in depth approach will include technical solutions, technical solutions
do not stop all attacks. Therefore, methods to stop attacks such as social engineering and
phishing should also be deployed (De Veiga & Eloff, 2010). Since people are the targets
of non-technical attacks, they should recognize these types of attacks and learn how to
prevent these attacks from succeeding (Kritzinger & von Solms, 2010).
Whitten and Tygar (1999) state that home computer users will not take the incentive
to obtain security training on their own. Therefore, the only security awareness training a
home computer user may get is the training they receive at work. Researchers have been
investigating the relationship between security awareness and security behavior with
varying results (Grant, 2010). Therefore, additional research is required to determine how
security aware home computer users are and if users’ security awareness influences their
security behavior (Grant, 2010).
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This study adds to the body of knowledge of security awareness research by
examining the relationship between security awareness and security behavior of a group
of home computer users. Although the target audience is home computer users, its results
should also generalize to corporate employees since employees are subject to the same
types of attacks used on home computer users (Symantec, 2011, April). This study is also
confirmatory in nature since it helps verify the results of previous security behavioral
studies that used a SBM.

Limitations and Delimitations
Limitations
This study made use of a web-based survey. Web-based surveys are subject to selfselection bias (Rea & Parker, 2005). Only those comfortable with taking web-based
surveys and interested in the topic will complete the survey. This may affect the
generalization of the study to the general population.
Many people not only use computers at home but also at work. This study looks at the
participants’ personal computer usage. It was possible that the participants in this study
considered their work computer usage when answering the survey questions. To deter the
participants from answering the survey questions based on work experiences, the survey
contained instructions for the participants that instructed them to consider only their
home computer usage when responding to the questions.

Delimitations
One of the problems with attempting to measure security awareness is developing a
survey that does not ask so many questions that participants taking the survey are

11
reluctant to complete it (Rea & Parker, 2005). Past researchers have reduced the size of
their questionnaires by studying only a portion of the security awareness domain.
Yoshikai et al. (2011) just studied users' security awareness of viruses. Ng et al. (2009)
only used email related security behavior in their HBM study. Katz (2005) and Grant
(2010) asked questions covering much of the domain for security behavior but only a
couple of their questions covered security awareness. This study is also restricted in
scope, only covering security awareness as it pertains to computer social engineering. As
suggested by Rea and Parker (2005) the goal is to create a survey instrument that takes no
longer than 15 minutes to complete.

Barriers and Issues
Before determining how security aware a user is one must define security awareness
and create a method to measure it. This can be difficult since the security awareness
concerns may vary from one organization or demographic group to another. For example,
a large corporation may consider downloading files from the Internet a concern.
Employees downloading files can use up bandwidth, reduce productivity, introduce
malware in the corporate Intranet, and put the corporation at legal risk. Although for
home computer users, introducing malware into their home networks is a concern, the
other concerns a corporation have, such as downloading files, may not concern home
computer users. This study will use home computer users as participants so some aspects
of the study may not apply to corporate users.
Acquiring enough qualified participants for a study can be problematic. The webbased survey provider SurveyMonkey provided the participants for the study.
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SurveyMonkey selects participants randomly from a member panel base of over 30
million people. This approach better represents the target population than using other
convenient samples such as university students or listserves (Son & Kim, 2008).

Summary
Attacks on computer systems continue to be a problem. Malware and phishing attacks
are increasing (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2015). These attacks have affected
millions of users and have cost businesses and consumers billions of dollars (AntiPhishing Working Group, 2015). Much of the malware designed today use social
engineering techniques, which allows the attackers to bypass the technical safeguards put
in place by security software (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2011; Carroll, 2006). Home
computer users need to be aware of these attacks and learn how to protect themselves
from them (Kritzinger & von Solms, 2010).
Researchers have been exploring ways to improve security awareness with
encouraging results (Cone et al., 2007; Maurer et al., 2011). Preliminary studies indicate
that the more security aware a user is the better the user's security behavior will be
(Furnell et al., 2007; Grant, 2010; Katz, 2005; North et al., 2010). Corporations are
implementing security awareness programs to improve the security behavior of their
employees (Cone et al., 2007; Kruger & Kearney, 2006; McCoy & Fowler, 2004). Yet it
seems that security awareness programs have little effect on security behavior
(Albrechtsen, 2007; Conlan & Tarasewich, 2006; Workman, 2007). Therefore, it is
unclear if users are security aware. In addition, it is unclear if security awareness
influences users’ security behavior. Therefore more research is needed to determine what
influences users to practice good security behavior (Grant, 2010; Ng et al., 2009).
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Previous researchers have used modified versions of the HBM to study security
behavior (Claar, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng et al., 2009). Researchers developed the
Health Belief Model (HBM) to study the behavior of people in health related studies
(Hochbaum, 1958). The HBM consists of eight constructs (Hayden, 2009): perceived
severity, perceived susceptibility, perceived threat, perceived benefits, perceived barriers,
cues to action, self-efficacy, and modifying variables. The research model for this study
was adapted from the HBM. The security awareness construct was added to SBM to
determine what affect security awareness has on a person's security behavior.
The goal of this study was to determine if home computer users are security aware and
if there is a relationship between security awareness and home computer users' security
behavior. The study is based on previous research in security awareness and security
behavior. The research questions investigated were:
RQ1: Is there a relationship between home computer users’ security-awareness
and security behavior?
RQ2: Is the relationship between security awareness and security behavior
intervened by other factors?
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

Introduction
Attacks on computer systems continue to be a problem. The Anti-Phishing Working
Group (2015, April) reported 197,252 unique phishing attacks for the fourth quarter
2014. Symantec (2007, September) reported that 95% of Internet based attacks targeted
home computer users. Home computer users need to be aware of the types of malicious
attacks targeted at them. They also need to know how to defend against the attacks.
However, it is unclear how security aware users are. In addition, it is unclear if their
security awareness influences their security behavior required to defend against malicious
attacks.
The purpose of this study is to determine what role security awareness plays in home
computer users' motivation in practicing good security behavior. The model developed
for this study leveraged the constructs from the health belief model (HBM), self-efficacy
in information security, concern for information privacy, and security awareness to
provide some insight on the subject of security awareness and security behavior. Figure 2
contains the research model for this study. A detailed discussion of the research model is
contained later in this chapter.
As in previous security behavioral studies (Claar, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng,
2009) this study used the HBM as the basis for the research model. The model contains
the HBM constructs of perceived threats, perceived susceptibility, perceived severity,
expectations (perceived benefits and perceived barriers), and cues to action. As in the
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HBM, the research model includes expectations and perceived threats as determinants to
a user's security behavior. The research model uses cues to action as an antecedent to the
perceived threat construct.

Self-Efficacy in
Information Security

+

H4

Expectations
(perceived benefits perceived barriers)

+
H9

H1

+

Security Awareness

+

H2

Concern for
Information Privacy

+

-

H5

Security Behavior

+
H6
H3

perceived
susceptibility /
perceived severity

+

H10

+
H7

Perceived Security
Threat

H8

+
Cues to Action

Figure 2. Security Belief Model.

The research model contains two constructs not contained in the HBM: security
awareness and concern for information privacy (CFIP). Security awareness is the focus of
this study. The research model is based on the belief that security awareness has an effect
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on self-efficacy in information security, self-efficacy will have a positive effect on a
user's expectations, and user's expectations will have a positive effect on a person’s intent
to perform good security behavior. In addition, security awareness should have a positive
effect on a user's threat perception, on a user's concern for information privacy, and that
concern for information privacy has a negative effect on a user's security behavior.
The remainder of this chapter lays down the foundation for this study. It covers the
theoretical foundations for the HBM, SEIS, and CFIP models. It provides a review of the
current literature of these models and for research in security awareness. It also presents
the hypotheses for is study.

Theoretical Foundation
Health Belief Model
In the 1950s, social psychologists in the U.S. Public Health Service developed the
HBM (Figure 3) to explain the failure of people to participate in tuberculosis healthscreening programs (Glanz et al., 2008; Hochbaum, 1958). The researchers based the
HBM on psychological and behavioral models that posit an individual’s behavior
depends upon the value the individual places on a specified goal and the likelihood of
achieving the goal by performing a given action (Janz & Becker, 1984). In the context of
health-related behavior, it is the individual’s desire to avoid an illness or get better if
already ill and the individual’s belief that a specific action will prevent or cure the illness
(Janz & Becker, 1984). Other researchers extended the model to study individuals'
responses to symptoms and their behavior in response to a diagnosed illness (Glanz et al.,
2008).
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The HBM consists of eight constructs; perceived severity, perceived susceptibility,
perceived threat, perceived benefits, perceived barriers, cues to action, self-efficacy, and
modifying variables (Hayden, 2009). The four major HBM constructs are perceived
severity, perceived susceptibility, perceived benefits, and perceived barriers (Hayden,
2009). As Rosenstock (1974, p. 332) states, “The combined levels of susceptibility and
severity provided the energy or force to act and the perception of benefits (less barriers)
provided a preferred path of action.” Janz and Becker (1984) states that a stimulus is
required to trigger the individual’s decision making process. Therefore, researchers added
the cues to action construct to the HBM. In addition, diverse demographic, sociopsychological, and structural variables may affect an individual’s perception, thus
influencing the individual’s health-related behavior (Janz & Becker, 1984).
The perceived severity construct is concerned with a person's belief about the
seriousness of a health problem. People perceive the seriousness of a health problem
based on medical information and beliefs about the effects of a health problem on their
life in general (Hayden, 2009). The perceived susceptibility construct refers to “the
subjective risks of contracting a condition” (Rosenstock, 1966, p. 99). A person's
perception of susceptibility of a disease varies. Some people will deny the possibility of
contracting the disease, while others may recognize the possibility of contracting the
disease or feel the disease is dangerous (Claar, 2011). The perceived threat construct is
the combination of perceived susceptibility and perceived severity (Glanz et al., 2008).
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Modifying Factors

Individual Perceptions

Likelihood of Action

Perceived Benefits
minus
Perceived Barriers

Demographic
Variables

Perceived
Susceptibility /
Perceived
Seriousness

Perceived Threat

Intent to Take
Action

Self-efficacy
Cues to Action

Figure 3. Health Belief Model. Adapted from Glanz et al., (2008).

The perceived benefits construct is "a person's opinion of the value or usefulness of a
new behavior in decreasing the risk of developing a disease" (Hayden, 2009, p. 32). It is
"the individual's beliefs about availably and effectiveness of various courses of action,
not the objective facts about the benefits, that determine a person's health behavior" (Ng
et al., 2009, p. 819). The perceived barriers construct is the "belief about the tangible and
psychological costs of the advised action" (Glanz et al., 2008, Figure 3.1). Individuals
may believe that an action is beneficial but still are reluctant to act because they consider
the action inconvenient or unpleasant to perform. Perceived benefits minus perceived
barriers determine what action an individual takes.
The cues to action construct are "events, people, or things that move people to change
their behavior." (Hayden, 2009, p. 33). A cue to action could be an illness of a friend or
family member, media reports, advice from a friend or family member, or a
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recommendation from a health care professional. Cues to action can take the form of a
reminder sent by a health care professional, a poster, product warning labels, pamphlets
to promote awareness, or highway signs promoting safe driving practices (Claar, 2011;
Glanz et al., 2008; Hayden, 2009).
Self-efficacy has been widely used in HBM health behavioral research (Glanz et al.,
2008; Janz & Becker, 1984; Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker, 1988). In the original HBM
model, self-efficacy is part of the perceived barriers construct (Janz & Becker, 1984).
Rosenstock et al. (1988) argued for adding self-efficacy as a separate construct in the
HBM to provide a more powerful approach to understanding and influencing healthrelated behavior. Hayden (2009) states that self-efficacy affects person's perceived
benefits and perceived barriers.
Modifying factors in the HBM are diverse demographic, socio-psychological, and
structural variables. These constructs influence perceived severity, perceived
susceptibility, perceived benefits, and perceived barriers (Glanz et al., 2008). Examples
of modifying variables are age, gender, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic, experience, and
education.
Researchers have used the HBM in a variety of health-related studies in a variety of
environments. Researchers have used the HBM to study vaccination behavior (Janz &
Becker, 1984). The researchers found that perceived severity, perceived susceptibility,
perceived benefits, and perceived barriers were predictors of a person’s intent to
vaccinate against the flu (Aho, 1979; Chen et al., 2011; Cummings, Jett, Brock, &
Haefner, 1997; Larson, Olsen, Cole, & Shortell, 1979; Rundall & Wheeler, 1979).
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However, not all of the studies found perceived severity as having a significant effect on
vaccination behavior (Aho, 1979; Chen et al., 2011; Rundall & Wheeler, 1979).
Researchers used the HBM to study health-related behavior as related to breast cancer.
HBM researchers found that women adhere to mammography recommendations if they
have a perceived susceptibility to breast cancer, lower perceived barriers, higher
perceived benefits, and get some form of recommendation (cues to action) from a health
care professional (Champion, 1984; Champion & Menon, 1997; Menon et al., 2007).
Similar results were found in colorectal cancer screening research (Rawl, Champion,
Menon, & Foster, 2000; Wardle et al., 2003).
Researchers have found relationships between safe sex behavior and perceived
susceptibility, perceived barriers, perceived benefits, and self-efficacy (Glanz et al.,
2008). Some researchers have found relationships between perceived susceptibility and
condom use (Basen-Engquist, 1992; Hounton, Carabin, & Henderson, 2005; Mahoney,
Thombs, & Ford, 1995). Hounton et al. (2005), and Volk and Koopman (2001) found a
relationship between perceived barriers and condom use. Researchers have found that
self-efficacy has a strong influence on safe sex behaviors (Hounton et al., 2005; Lin,
Simoni, & Zemon, 2005; Wight, Abraham, & Scott, 1998; Zak-Place & Stern, 2000).
Other studies include oral hygiene, where perceived severity and self-efficacy
influenced patients’ intent to brush their teeth (Anagnostopoulos, Buchanan,
Frousiounioti, Niakas, & Potamianos, 2011). In a study of the smoking habits of
teenagers, the researchers found a relationship between teenagers smoking habits and
their perceived benefits, cues to action, and self-efficacy to smoking (Reisi et al., 2014).
Researchers studying the adaptive behaviors of people during heat waves found a
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relationship between perceived benefits and cues to action, to the adaptive behavior
(Akompab et al., 2013).
Janz and Becker (1984) conducted a study, which analyzed 46 previous HBM research
papers. Janz and Becker (1984) found that the barriers construct was the most powerful
predictor of health-related behavior. It was statistically significant in 89% of the studies
reviewed. The susceptibility construct was statistically significant in 81% of the studies.
The benefits construct was statistically significant in 78% of the studies. Severity was the
lowest being statistically significant in only 65% of the studies.
The HBM is a psychosocial model. Therefore, it only accounts for an individual’s
health-related behaviors explained by the individual’s attitudes and beliefs. Other forces
influence health actions, such as habitual behaviors, (i.e. cigarette smoking or tooth
brushing) that counter the individual’s psychosocial decision-making process (Janz &
Becker, 1984). Individuals may perform health-related behaviors for non-health reasons
such as dieting to look more attractive or stop smoking to gain social approval. Economic
and/or environmental factors may prevent the individual from taking the preferred course
of action, such as worker that is required to work in a hazardous environment or a
resident in a city with high levels of air pollution that cannot to move out of the city (Janz
& Becker, 1984).
Another limitation of the HBM is that the model is cognitively based. The HBM does
not consider the emotional aspect of behavior (Glanz et al., 2008). An example is fear.
Witte (1992) considers fear as an essential part of health-related behavior. Witte (1992)
defines fear as “a negatively-valenced emotion, accompanied by a high level of arousal,
and is elicited by a threat that is perceived to be significant and personally relevant”
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(Witte, 1992, p. 332). Some studies have shown that the relationship between fear and the
HBM constructs may be a useful predictor of health-related behavior (Champion, Menon,
Rawl, & Skinner, 2004; Champion, Skinner, & Menon, 2005). In addition, for the HBM
to be useful in explaining health-related behavior the individuals under study must value
their health and cues to action must be widely prevalent (Janz & Becker, 1984).

Health Belief Model In IS Security
The HBM has been used by researchers in the IS domain in an attempt to explain
users' security behavior (Claar, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng et al., 2009). Ng et al.
(2009) used the HBM to study email related security behavior. The Ng et al. (2009)
research model contained the HBM constructs of self-efficacy, perceived severity,
perceived susceptibility, perceived benefits, perceived barriers, and cues to action as
determinants of security behavior. Their model used the perceived severity construct as a
modifier to the other constructs. Ng et al. (2009) added a general security orientation
construct to their modified version of the HBM as a determinant of security behavior.
General security orientation refers to "a user's predisposition and interest concerning
practicing computer security." (Ng et al., 2009, p. 819).
Claar (2011) also conducted a study using the HBM as a base for the research model.
Claar (2011) used six constructs as determinants of security behavior in his research
model. The six constructs were perceived vulnerability, perceived susceptibility,
perceived benefits, perceived barriers, self-efficacy, and cues to action. Claar (2011) used
gender, age, education, and prior experience as moderators to perceived vulnerability,
perceived susceptibility, perceived benefits, perceived barriers, and self-efficacy.
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Liang and Xue (2009) developed the technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT) to
explain why users avoid security threats. Liang and Xue (2010) performed a study on
their TTAT model (Figure 4) to test how well TTAT could explain IT threat avoidance
behavior of personal computer users. The Liang and Xue (2010) model used perceived
threat, safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, and self-efficacy as direct determinants of
avoidance motivation. Safeguard effectiveness is the same as the HBM perceived benefits
construct. Safeguard costs is the same as the HBM perceived barriers construct.
Avoidance motivation is "the degree to which IT users are motivated to avoid IT threats
by taking safeguarding measures." (Liang & Xue, 2010, p. 84).

Perceived
Seriousness

Perceived Threat

Avoidance
Motivation

Avoidance Behavior

Safeguard
Effectiveness

Safeguard Cost

Self-Efficacy

Perceived
Susceptibility

Note: Interaction

Figure 4. Revised TTAT Model. Adapted from Liang and Xue (2010).
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Self-efficacy
The construct of self-efficacy is “the conviction that one can successfully execute the
behavior required to produce the outcomes” (Bandura, 1977, p. 193). Bandura (1977)
argues that expectations of efficacy determine whether the person will initiate coping
behavior, how much effort a person will expend on the coping behavior, and how long
the person will sustain the coping behavior if confronted with obstacles or aversive
experiences.
Bandura (1977) differentiates between outcome expectations and efficacy
expectations. An outcome expectation is "a person's estimate that a given behavior will
lead to certain outcomes" (Bandura, 1977, p. 193). Bandura (1977) argues that
individuals will not change their behavior if they believe they cannot perform the
necessary actions, even if they believe the actions will produce the desired result. Some
information security researchers used self-efficacy in their model (Claar, 2011; Liang &
Xue, 2010; Ng et al, 2009). The results in their information security studies showed that
self-efficacy has a direct influence on a person's security behavior.

Self-Efficacy in Information Security
Rhee et al. (2009) developed a model (Figure 5.) called self-efficacy in information
security (SEIS). Rhee et al. (2009) used the model to test how self-efficacy in the
information security domain influenced security practice behavior and motivation to
strengthen security efforts. Rhee et al. (2009) defines SEIS as “a belief in one’s capability
to protect information and information systems from unauthorized disclosure,
modification, loss, destruction, and lack of availability.” (Rhee et al., 2009, p. 818).
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Rhee et al. (2009) defined three constructs as antecedents to SEIS: computer/Internet
experience, security breach incidents, and general controllability. Computer/Internet
experience is the number of years of computer/Internet experience an individual has. It is
also how computer/Internet literate the individual perceives himself or herself to be.
Security breach incidents are adverse security events experienced by a computer user,
such as a virus infection, a spyware infection, or a phishing attack. General controllability
is an individual's belief that security threats are controllable, technology exists that can
prevent the security threats, and the means to control security threats exists.

Computer/Internet
Experience

Security Breach
Incidents

General
Controllability

Security Practice Technology

Self-Efficacy in
Information Security

Intention to
Strengthen Security
Effort

Security Practice –
Care Behavior

Figure 5. Self-Efficacy in Information Security Model. Adapted from Rhee et al. (2009).

SEIS influences security practice-technology, security practice-care behavior, and
intention to strengthen security effort. Security practice-technology refers to "the use of
security software and features such as anti-virus software, anti-spyware, and a pop-up
blocking function" (Rhee et al., 2009, p. 818). Security practice-care behavior refers to
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"security compliance behavior in using a computer and the Internet, such as use of a
strong password and frequency of making a backup copy." (Rhee et al., 2009, p. 818).
Intention to strengthen security effort is an individual's desire to enforce stronger security
procedures, protect information stored on computers, protect the computers that store
information, purchase security software, and learn more about information security (Rhee
et al., 2009).
Rhee et al. (2009) found that negative experiences with security decreases security
self-efficacy. Rhee et al. (2009) also found that users who believed that the technology
and procedures to control security threats were available had greater security self-efficacy
than users who did not. Individuals with high SEIS used more security software and
tended to use more of the features in the security software than their low SEIS
counterparts (Rhee et al., 2009). In addition, high SEIS individuals tend to apply security
updates more often than low SEIS individuals do.

Privacy
Smith, Milberg, and Burke (1996) developed and validated an instrument that
identifies and measures individuals' concern for information privacy (CFIP) in the
context of organizational information privacy practices. Smith et al. (1996) divided CFIP
into four constructs; collection, errors, unauthorized secondary use, and improper access.
Collection is the individuals concern that their personally identifiable information will be
stored in databases (Smith et al., 1996). The errors construct is an individuals' concern
that an organization inadequately protects their data against deliberate or accidental errors
(Smith et al., 1996). Unauthorized secondary use is the individuals' concern that an
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organization will use their stored information for unintended purposes without the
individuals' authorization (Smith et al., 1996). Improper access is an individual's concern
that personal data is available to persons not authorized to access the data (Smith et al.,
1996).
Van Slyke, Shin, Johnson, and Jiang (2006) performed a study on the CFIP in online
consumer purchasing. Van Slyke et al. (2006) used the Smith et al. (1996) constructs of
collection, errors, unauthorized secondary use, and improper access as antecedents to
CFIP (Figure 6). Van Slyke et al. (2006) used these constructs to determine how CFIP
influenced a person's trust, risk perception, and willingness to create transactions on a
commercial website. Van Slyke et al. (2006) also studied if familiarity with the merchant
influenced a person's trust or risk perception of the merchant.

Trust

Familiarity

Willingness to
Transact

Risk Perception

Privacy Concern

Improper Access

Secondary Use

Errors

Collection

Figure 6. Online Consumer Privacy Research Model. Adapted from Van Slyke et al.
(2006).
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Literature Review and Theory Development
Security Awareness
Security awareness can be thought of as having knowledge of good security practices
and knowing the importance of protecting personal and/or corporate data residing on the
computers that the user accesses. Several studies that have shown, to some extent, that
security awareness may have an effect on a person’s intent to practice good security
behavior (Furnell et al. 2007; Grant, 2010; Hagen & Albrechtsen, 2009; Katz, 2005;
North et al., 2010).
Katz (2005) conducted a study on university faculty and staff members to determine if
there was a need for information security awareness educational programs at the
university. Katz (2005) found that most participants performed good password security
behavior. Most participants turned off their computers before they left at night. In
addition, most participants never opened an attachment to an e-mail from an un-trusted
source. However, many participants did not run an anti-virus scan regularly, did not back
up their data on a regular basis, or used a password protected screen saver.
The mixed results for the security behavior of the participants of the survey seem to
back the assumption that university employees were lacking in security awareness. Since
most employees never read the university's security policies, Katz (2005) suggested that
employees should read and follow the policies found on the university's security website.
Katz (2005) also suggested that the university include projects in their information
security course that teaches students on how to create security awareness programs.
Hagen and Albrechtsen (2009) performed a study on the effectiveness of a securitytraining program on employees of a maritime company. The results of the study showed
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that employees' security knowledge, security awareness, and security behavior improved
after taking the security training. After the security training, employees in the test group
were more apt to protect access to their computers, report security violations, locked their
unattended PCs, and secure their passwords. These findings seem to indicate that security
behavior improves as security awareness improves.
Grant (2010) conducted a study to analyze the relationship between the security
awareness of users and their security behavior. Grant (2010) also studied the affect
demographics had on the security awareness and security behavior of users. Grant (2010)
found that that:


Females were more security aware than their male counterparts.



Participants younger than 40 years old were more security aware than their older
counterparts.



Participants who did not attend college were more security aware than their higher
educated counterparts.



Participants in nontechnical positions were more security aware than their
counterparts in technical positions.



There is a relation between users’ security behavior and their levels of security
awareness.

However, it is unclear how much of an affect security awareness had on security
behavior. Ninety-two percent of participants received security awareness training and
94% of the participants seemed to know what to do if they encountered a virus alert. This
should indicate that the participants had high security awareness. Yet the participants
seemed to be lacking in good security behavior. Only 44% of the participants regularly
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scanned their email attachments. Only 55% of the participants regularly used a password
save feature. Forty-one percent of the participants let others use their computer. Either
security awareness had little effect on the participants' security behavior or the security
awareness training was inadequate. As Grant (2010) stated more studies are required to
determine if there is a link between security awareness and security behavior of users.
North et al. (2010) conducted a study to compare the security awareness and ethics of
students attending a technology university to students attending a liberal arts university.
The survey consisted of two parts, one part on security awareness, and the other part on
ethics. The study shows that the technical students are more apt to install and maintain
anti-virus software on their personal computers than the liberal art students. There was a
large difference between the technical students and the liberal arts students when it came
to using a firewall on their personal computers. The technical students were more likely
to password protect their personal computers and had a tendency to use stronger
passwords than their liberal art counterparts did. There was no significant difference
between the technical students and the liberal arts students when it came to performing
data backups.
The North et al. (2010) showed that there are differences in the security behavior in
students that attended a technical university as compared to students attending a liberal
arts university. The study showed that the students that attended a technical university
were more likely to practice good security behavior than their liberal arts counterparts
were. The study did not show any differences in the security awareness of students that
attended a technical university as compared to students attending a liberal arts university.
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In the survey, North et al. (2010) asked the participants about their tendency to use
good security behavior, not how security aware they were. Security behavior questions by
themselves cannot determine if the participants were security aware. Other factors could
have affected the participant's behavior, such as decreased productivity, ease of use,
subjective norms, perceived susceptibility, or self-efficacy (Albrechtsen, 2007; Hazari,
Hargrave, & Clenney, 2008; Ifinedo, 2011; Ng et al., 2009). Therefore, the results of the
survey were not a good indication if the participants were security aware.
Furman, Theofanos, Choong, and Stanton (2012) conducted a qualitative study on
people’s perceptions of cyber security. Furman et al. (2012) found that only eight percent
of the participants had received some type of security training or education. Seventy
percent of the participants considered themselves at least moderately knowledgeable on
computer security concepts.
However, on average the participants' mental model of the security terms was poor.
Furman et al. (2012) found that the participants used coping mechanisms to justify their
insecure on-line activities. The Furman et al. (2012) study seems to indicate that users
had a desire to perform good security practices. However, the participants' poor mental
models of security concepts and participants' use of coping mechanisms to justify their
actions suggests that the participants were not security aware.
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Hypotheses
Security Awareness
Rhee et al. (2009) found that negative experiences with security decreases security
self-efficacy. Rhee et al. (2009) also found that users who believed that the technology
and procedures are available to control security threats had greater security self-efficacy
than users who did not. This seems to indicate that security awareness could have a
positive effect on security self-efficacy since security aware users would know of
technologies and procedures available to prevent and eliminate security threats.
Therefore, the hypothesis for the security awareness construct's influence on self-efficacy
is as follows.
H1: Security awareness is positively related to a person's self-efficacy.

Al Abri et al. (2009) found, in their study on users' intent to use e-government
services, that privacy awareness had an influence on individuals' privacy risk concerns.
Individuals who have awareness for the value of their information stored by e-commerce
companies have a tendency to demand control over the disclosure and use of their
information (Olivero & Hunt, 2004). Dinev and Hart (2005) found that Internet literacy
had an influence on a person's concern for privacy.
Dinev and Hart (2005) studied whether or not social awareness had an effect on
Internet privacy concerns. Social awareness is "citizens’ behavior with respect to
following and being interested in and knowledgeable about community and government
policies and initiatives, including those related to technology and the Internet." (Dinev &
Hart, 2005, p. 9). As part of Internet literacy, Dinev and Hart (2005) discussed the need
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for users to be aware of viruses, worms, spyware, and malicious emails, which may be a
threat to the user's privacy. Dinev and Hart (2005) argue that literate Internet users have
stronger privacy concerns due to their understanding of the seriousness, the core
vulnerabilities, and the insecurities of the Internet. Dinev and Hart (2005) found that
social awareness has a positive effect on the concern for privacy construct.
It is hypothesized that awareness for the need to protect the privacy of information
will increase a person’s concern for privacy. Therefore the hypothesis for the security
awareness construct's influence on a person's concern for information privacy is as
follows.
H2: Security Awareness is positively related to a person's concern for information
privacy.

D'Arcy et al. (2009) studied how an organization's security counter measures would
affect their employees' intent to ignore security policies. D'Arcy et al. (2009) found that
an employee’s awareness of security policies had an effect on an employee’s perceived
certainty of sanctions, which is a similar construct to the HBM’s perceived susceptibility.
Furthermore D'Arcy et al. (2009) found that an employee’s awareness of security policies
had an effect on an employee’s perceived severity of sanctions, which is a construct
similar to the HBM’s perceived severity. It is hypothesized that a person's security
awareness will be a factor in determining if a person considers a security event a threat.
Therefore the hypothesis for the security awareness construct's influence on a person's
perception of a security threat is as follows.
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H3: Security awareness is positively related to a person's perception of a security
threat.

Self-Efficacy in Information Security
Self-efficacy is an individual’s belief that he or she can perform the activities that are
required to produce a desired outcome. Rosenstock et al. (1988) added the self-efficacy
construct to the HBM. Glanz et al. (2008) states that in addition to individuals believing
that there is a threat and that there is a benefit to take action, individuals must also believe
that they can perform the actions required to overcome the barriers. In Claar's (2011)
study of the adoption of computer security software in the home computer environment,
Claar (2011) found that self-efficacy influences a person's security behavior. Ng et al.
(2009) also found in their study on email related security behavior, that self-efficacy
influences a person's security behavior.
When it came to computer and Internet security compliance behavior, individuals with
high SEIS fared better than their low SEIS counterparts did (Rhee et al., 2009).
Individuals with high SEIS tended to strengthen their security efforts. The more computer
and internet experience individuals have the higher their SEIS. Rhee et al. (2009) found
that individuals who were victims of security incidents such as virus infections, spyware,
and cyber fraud had low SEIS. To increase employee SEIS Rhee et al. (2009) suggests
organizations increase their employees' understanding of technology and provide
employees with security awareness training.
Generally, people will not try to perform a task if they feel they will not be successful
at it. If a person feels a behavior is useful (perceived benefits) but feels they cannot
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perform the task (perceived barriers), they will probably not attempt to perform the task
(Hayden, 2009). If a person feels incapable of configuring a security option in a browser,
that person will consider it a barrier to securing the browser and not perform the action.
In smoking behavioral studies, researchers have found a relationship between
individuals’ belief in their ability to stop smoking (an aspect viewed as perceived
barriers) and their smoking behavior. Therefore, self-efficacy should affect expectations.
Compeau and Higgins (1995) argue that tailoring self-efficacy to measure a specific
domain under study maximizes the measure’s predictive power. Therefore, the research
model uses the Rhee et al. (2009) construct of self-efficacy in information security (SEIS)
instead of using the general self-efficacy construct. It is hypothesized that SEIS will have
a positive effect on expectations. The hypothesis for the SEIS's influence on the
expectations construct is as follows.
H4: Self-Efficacy in Information Security is positively related to a person's
expectations (perceived benefits minus perceived barriers) of acting on a
security threat.

Concern for Information Privacy
Internet users who have a concern for their privacy believe that companies with an
online presence tend to misuse customers' personal information (Dinev & Hart, 2005;
Van Slyke et al., 2006). A Son and Kim (2008) study showed that people would refuse to
divulge information to online companies if they feel there is a threat to their privacy. In
addition, people would remove their information if they felt that there was a threat to
their privacy after giving an online company access to their information.
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Individuals' concern for privacy influences their decision to allow storing of their
information on electronic media (Angst & Agarwal, 2009; Dinev & Hart, 2005). Li,
Sarathy, and Zhang (2008) found that consumers' concern for privacy has a negative
influence on their intention to make online purchases. Li et al. (2008) found that concern
for privacy had a negative effect on a user's intention to use an unfamiliar vendor
website. Li et al. (2008) also found in their study, how emotions play a part in consumers'
decision to make online purchases and that consumers' concern for privacy had a negative
influence on their intention to make online purchases.
Angst and Agarwal (2009) conducted a study to determine what factors persuade
people to change their attitudes and their intentions to allow storage of their medical
information in electronic health records (EHRs). The results of the study show that
concern for information privacy has an influence on an individual’s attitude toward the
use of EHRs. The study also shows that attitudes and concern for information privacy
influence the likelihood that the individual will opt-in to EHRs. Hichang (2010) found
that concern for privacy was a determinant of users' intent to take proactive actions to
protect their privacy. Hichang (2010) also found that users did not provide personal
information if they felt their privacy threatened.
Al Abri et al. (2009) have shown that a user’s perception of the trustworthiness of egovernment services affects the intention to use e-government services. Cho (2010) found
that Internet users’ concern about online privacy affects their self-protection behavior.
The self-protection mechanisms are avoidance, opting out, and proactive protection (Cho,
Rivera, & Lim, 2009). Son and Kim (2008) found that Internet users’ privacy concerns
affect their behavior toward online companies. To protect their privacy users would
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refuse to conduct business with the online company, falsify personal information, quit
patronizing the business, communicate dissatisfaction with the business to acquaintances,
complain directly to the online company, and complain indirectly to a third party
organization.
It is believed the concern for information privacy will have the same negative effect
on the computer security behavior as the concern for information privacy had on the
intent to conduct business with online vendors in previous privacy studies. It is
hypothesized that an individual’s concern for privacy will cause the individual to engage
in self-protection behavior. This behavior may prevent an individual from performing
good security behavior such as downloading security software, applying fixes, or
allowing automated updates for fear of giving up too much personal information.
Therefore, the hypothesis for the concern for information privacy construct's influence on
good computer security behavior is as follows.
H5: Concern for Information Privacy is negatively related to a person's computer
security behavior.

Concern for information privacy is "An individual's personality trait or general
tendency to worry about information privacy." (Li et al., 2008, p. 41). Van Slyke et al.
(2006) found that CFIP affects a consumer’s trust and risk perception. Van Slyke et al.
(2006) also found that familiarity with an online merchant would affect consumers' trust
in the merchant and their perception of risks when generating online transactions. A
consumer's trust in an online merchant will affect the consumer's risk perception of
generating online transactions with that merchant. Van Slyke et al. (2006) found users’
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concern for privacy influenced their perception of risk when dealing with online
merchants. Internet users who have a concern for their privacy believe that companies
with an online presence tend to misuse customers’ personal information (Dinev & Hart,
2006; Van Slyke et al., 2006).
Al Abri et al. (2009) have shown that users’ perceived risk of giving personal
information to the government affects their trustworthiness of e-government services.
Cho (2010) has shown that there is a relationship between perceived vulnerability to a
privacy risk and a person’s concern for privacy. Cho (2010) also shows that there is a
relationship between the severity of a privacy risk and a person’s concern for privacy.
This would seem to indicate that Internet users’ concern for privacy would have an
influence on whether or not they perceive their privacy concerns as security threats.
Therefore, the hypothesis for the concern for information privacy's influence on a
person's perception of a security threat is as follows.
H6: Concern for Information Privacy is positively related to a person's perception
of a security threat.

Perceived Susceptibility / Perceived Severity
In the HBM, perceived susceptibility is the belief one has about the risk in contracting
a disease or condition (Glanz et al., 2008). Perceived severity is the view on the
seriousness of a disease or condition and the clinical and/or social consequences of
contracting the disease or condition (Glanz et al., 2008). For the purposes of this study
perceived susceptibility is an individual's belief that he or she is vulnerable to a given
computer security threat. Perceived severity is an individual's belief of how adversely he
or she will be affected by a given computer security threat.
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Liang and Xue (2010) found that perceived susceptibility and perceived severity had
an influence on a perceived security threat. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the
perceived severity of a security incident in combination with the perceived susceptibility
to that security incident will determine if the person perceives the security incident as a
threat that requires action. The hypothesis for the perceived susceptibility/ perceived
severity construct is as follows.
H7: The combination of perceived susceptibility and perceived severity is
positively related to a person's perception of a security threat.

Cues to Action
In the HBM, cues to action are events that motivate people to change their behavior
(Hayden, 2009). Hochbaum (1958) stated that cues to action could be physical changes in
a person's body, media reports, articles on an illness, knowing someone who has an
illness, or advice from a trusted person. For the purposes of this study, cues to action are
a person's prior experience with security problems, media reports on computer security,
security articles, and information from a trusted source.
In the Claar (2011) and Ng et al. (2009) studies cues to action did not have an
influence on a person's security behavior. Some researchers in health care research have
used cues to action as an antecedent to perceived threats (Cry, Dunnagan, & Haynes,
2010; Hayden, 2009; Janz & Becker, 1984). This study used cues to action as an
antecedent to perceived threats to determine if cues to action have an influence on a
person's threat perception. It is hypothesized that cues to action will have a positive
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influence on a person's perception of an event being a security threat. Therefore, the
hypothesis for the cues to action construct is as follows.
H8: Cues to Action is positively related to a person's perception of an event being
a security threat.

Expectations
In the HBM perceived benefits minus perceived barriers has a direct effect on a
person’s intent to take action (Glanz et al., 2008, Hayden, 2009; Janz & Becker, 1984).
Claar (2011) used perceived benefits and perceived barriers to be direct determinants to a
person’s security behavior. Ng et al. (2009) also used perceived benefits and perceived
barriers as a direct determinant to a person’s security behavior. Liang and Xue (2010)
used safeguard effectiveness and safeguard costs (similar to perceived benefits and
perceived barriers) as determinants to avoidance motivation (intent to perform good
security behavior). Anderson and Agarwal (2010) found that perceived citizen
effectiveness, a concept similar to perceived benefits, had an effect on a person’s attitude
to perform security-related behavior.
In the HBM, perceived barriers are obstacles that a person views as preventing that
person from taking action. Janz and Becker (1984) consider perceived barriers as the
most significant construct for determining behavioral change. For the purposes of this
study perceived barriers will be defined as obstacles that negatively affect a person's
decision to act on a given security action. Claar (2011) found that perceived barriers had
a negative effect on a person’s security behavior. Ng et al. (2009) did not find perceived
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barriers having a negative effect on a person’s security behavior. Liang and Xue (2010)
found that safeguard cost was a determinant to avoidance motivation.
Perceived benefits consist of views that a person has on the value of a behavior
decreasing the chances of developing a disease or eliminating a current disease (Hayden,
2009). Non-health related perceptions also affect a person’s perceived benefits such as
financial savings or attempting to please a loved one (Glanz et al., 2008). For the purpose
of this study, perceived benefits are the belief of the effectiveness of an action to reduce
or eliminate a security threat. Ng et al. (2009) found that perceived benefits affected a
person’s security behavior. However, in Claar's (2011) study perceived benefits did not
have a positive effect on a person’s security behavior. Liang and Xue (2010) found that
safeguard effectiveness was a determinant to avoidance motivation.
This research will use the original concept of perceived benefits minus perceived
barriers having a direct effect on a person’s security behavior. In the research model for
this study the construct of expectations shows this relationship. It is hypothesized that
expectations has a positive influence on a person's security behavior. Therefore, the
hypothesis for the expectations construct is as follows.
H9: Expectations (perceived benefits - perceived barriers) is positively
related to a person's security behavior.

Perceived Security Threat
In the HBM, a perceived threat influences a person’s intent to perform health-related
behavior. It is determined by a person's perceived susceptibility to a disease or condition
and by the person's perceived severity of the disease or condition (Glanz et al., 2008).
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Individuals may feel susceptible to a disease or condition but not feel threatened by the
disease or condition because they do not feel the disease or condition is severe enough to
consider it a threat. On the other hand, individuals may feel the disease or condition is
severe but do not feel susceptible to the disease or condition, so they do not consider it a
threat. Therefore, it is the combination of perceived susceptibility and perceived severity
that form a perceived threat (Glanz et al., 2008; Hayden, 2009).
A perceived security threat is "the extent to which an individual perceives the
malicious IT as dangerous or harmful." (Liang & Xue, 2010, p. 397). It is also a
combination of perceived susceptibility and perceived severity. Claar (2011) and Ng et al.
(2009) found that perceived susceptibility influenced a person’s security behavior. Liang
and Xue (2010) found that the perceived threat construct is a determinant to intent to
perform security behavior, which is a predictor of security behavior. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that a perceived security threat will have an effect on a person's security
behavior. The hypothesis for the perceived threat construct is as follows.
H10: Perceived Threat is positively related to a person's security behavior.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Research Setting
This was a quantitative self-administered, closed-end study. It made use of a survey
instrument to measure a user's security awareness, a user's attitude toward security, and a
user's security behavior. The developed survey measured the participants' security
awareness, concern for information privacy, self-efficacy, expectations of security
actions, perceived security threats, cues to action, and security behavior.
The survey instrument was web-based since a web-based survey can be more
accurate, easier to administer, and contain the same quality of responses as a print-based
survey (Huang, 2006; Knapp & Kirk, 2003). Web-based surveys provide the participants
a convenient method to fill-out the questionnaire. It allows the participants to complete
the survey in the privacy of their own home and at their own pace (Rea & Parker, 2005).
Web-based surveys are cost effective and provide confidentiality and security for the data
provided by the participants (Rea & Parker, 2005).
There are disadvantages to web-based surveys. Participants must have access to a
computer, access to email, and have a minimum amount of computer literacy (Rea &
Parker, 2005) which may limit the response base. Web-based surveys are prone to selfselection bias (Rea & Parker, 2005). Since there is no interaction between the interviewer
and the participants, the participants cannot ask questions if they do not understand any
of the questions. This could lead to a compromise in the reliability of the survey (Rea &
Parker, 2005).
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Sample Characteristics
The participants for this study consisted of adults 18 years or older. This study
examined the behavior of home PC users. Therefore, the participants had a PC that they
accessed for personal use. Since the study looked at the participants' security behavior in
the context of computer social engineering, the participants also accessed the Internet on
a regular basis.

Sample Size
The study made use of the IBM SPSS SamplePower program to calculate the number
of participants required for the study. The input fields required by the SamplePower
program are number of variables, R2 value, and observed power. The number of
independent variables (38) was entered into the "Number Variables in Set" field, in the
SamplePower program. A medium R2 value of .13 (Cohen, 1988) was used. Rovai,
Baker, and Ponton (2014) suggest using an observed power of .80 or higher, therefore the
power was set to .90. The minimum number of required participants calculated by the
SamplePower program was 253. SurveyMonkey provided 267 participants for the study.

Instrumentation
Son and Kim (2008) used panel members of a market research firm for their study on
Internet users' privacy concerns. Angst and Agarwal (2009) acquired 80% of their
participants from an online survey company for their study on the role privacy concerns
in adoption of electronic health records. This study also acquired its participants from a
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web-based survey provider, SurveyMonkey. SurveyMonkey administered and collected
the data for the survey. The survey consisted of 50 questions (Table 2 and Appendix A).
The questions in the survey used a 5-point Likert scale. On the average, it took the
participants approximately five minutes to complete the survey.
SurveyMonkey selects participants randomly from a member panel base of over 30
million people and guarantees to provide the requested number of participants. This
approach should better represent the target population than using other convenience
sampling such as university students or listservs (Son & Kim, 2008). It also reduces the
adverse effects of self-selection bias and guarantees the correct response base.

Operationalization of Variables
To determine how well the participants reflected the general population, demographic
data was collected. The demographic variables of gender, age, job function, and security
awareness training was assessed using categorical response options. SurveyMonkey
provided the demographic variables of gender and age of the participants. The
participants were also asked how proficient they were at using email, using social media,
using word processors, online shopping, online banking, and writing computer programs.
The proficiency questions used a four point Likert scale (Appendix A.2).
The rest of the survey contained five sections; Health Belief Model (HBM), selfefficacy in information security, concern for information privacy, security behavior, and
security awareness. To capture the beliefs of the participants, all sections used a five
point Likert scale. The Likert scale works well when seeking the attitudes of the survey
participants (Nardi, 2003; Rea & Parker, 2005). Other researchers have also used the
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Likert scale in their security research to capture participants' attitudes and beliefs (Claar,
2011; Grant, 2010; Ng et al, 2009). Table 2 contains the survey questions and the source
for each question. Appendix A contains the survey as displayed by SurveyMonkey.
Survey instruments must accurately measure the constructs under study (Straub,
1989). The items selected for the survey instrument and the way the items are phrased
can adversely affect the measurement of the constructs (Straub, 1989). Straub (1989)
suggests, whenever possible, using survey instruments from previous studies. Therefore,
all of the questions in the survey are adapted from previous studies.

Perceived Severity / Perceived Susceptibility
The questions for the Health Belief Model (HBM) construct of perceived severity
(Table 2) are adapted from Claar (2011). There are four perceived severity questions,
labeled PSE1 - PSE4. The questions use a 5-point Likert scale from Very Low Impact to
Very High Impact. The questions for the HBM construct of perceived susceptibility are
also adapted from Claar (2011). There are four perceived susceptibility questions, labeled
PSU1 - PSU4. The questions use a 5-point Likert scale from Highly Unlikely to Highly
Likely. The perceived severity and perceived susceptibility questions measure the
participants' perception of a security threat.

Perceived Security Threat
There are four questions for the HBM construct of perceived threat, labeled PT1 PT4. These questions are adapted from Liang and Xue (2010). All of the questions use a
5-point Likert scale from Highly Disagree to Highly Agree. The perceived threat
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questions measure the participants' decision to take action to reduce or eliminate a
security threat.

Expectations
There are four questions for the HBM construct of perceived benefits, labeled BEN1 BEN4. Questions BEN1 and BEN4 are adapted from Ng et al. (2009). The questions
BEN2 is adapted from Hazari et al. (2008) and BEN3 is adapted from Liang and Xue
(2010). These questions use a 5-point Likert scale from Highly Unlikely to Highly
Likely.
There are four questions for the HBM construct of perceived barriers, labeled BAR1 BAR4. Questions BAR1, BAR2, and BAR3 are adapted from Ng et al. (2009). Question
BAR4 is adapted from Liang and Xue (2010). These questions use a 5-point Likert scale
from Highly Disagree to Highly Agree. The perceived benefits and perceived barriers
questions measure the participants' decision to take action to reduce or eliminate a
security threat (expectations).

Cues to Action
There are four questions for the HBM construct of cues to action, labeled CUE1 CUE4. The questions are adapted from Claar (2011). These questions use a 5-point Likert
scale from Highly Unlikely to Highly Likely. The cues to action questions measure to
what extent external cues (such as media reports or information from a trusted source)
changes a participant's perception of a security event.
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Self-efficacy in Information Security
There are four questions for the self-efficacy in information security construct, labeled
SE1 - SE4. The first question (SE1) is adapted from Ng et al. (2009). Questions SE2,
SE3, and SE4 are adapted from Rhee et al. (2009). These questions use a 5-point Likert
scale from Highly Unlikely to Highly Likely. The self-efficacy questions measure the
participants' belief that they can protect their PC and the data stored on it from malicious
attacks.

Concern for Information Privacy
There are four questions for the concern for information privacy construct, labeled
CP1 - CP4. All of the questions (CP1 - CP4) for the concern for information privacy
construct are adapted from Son and Kim (2008). The questions use a 5-point Likert scale
from Highly Unlikely to Highly Likely. The concern for information privacy questions
measure the participants' general tendency to worry about information privacy.

Security Behavior
There are four questions for the security behavior construct, labeled SB1 - SB4. The
first question (SB1) is adapted from Ng et al. (2009). SB2 is adapted from Nyeste (2011).
SB3 is adapted from Furman et al. (2012). SB4 is adapted from Kruger, Drevin, and
Steyn (2010). All of the questions use a 5-point Likert scale from Highly Disagree to
Highly Agree. The security behavior questions measure the participants' tendency to
practice good security behavior.
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Security Awareness
All of the questions for the security awareness construct are adapted from Mahabi
(2010). There are six security awareness questions, labeled SA1 - SA6. The first question
(SA1) uses a 5-point Likert scale from Highly Disagree to Highly Agree. Questions SA2
through SA6 use a 4-point Likert scale from Completely Unaware to Very Aware. The
security awareness questions measure the participants' knowledge of good security
practices and knowing the importance of protecting their personal information in the
context of computer social engineering.

Table 2. Survey Questions
Construct/
Variables
Perceived Severity

Description

Source/
Adapted From

Please indicate the impact that each of the following
scenarios would have on you if it would occur (In terms
of lost time, data, and (or) money).

PSE1

My PC being taken over by a hacker.

Claar, 2011

PSE2

My data being corrupted by a virus or a cyber attack.

Claar, 2011

PSE3

My identity (credit card number, social security
number, bank account etc.) being stolen from my PC
from a cyber attack.

Claar, 2011

PSE4

Downloading a file that is infected with a virus through
my email.

Claar, 2011

Perceived
Susceptibility

How likely do you feel that the following scenarios will
occur?

PSU1

My PC being taken over by a hacker.

Claar, 2011

PSU2

My identity (credit card number, social security
number, bank account etc.) being stolen from my PC.

Claar, 2011

PSU3

My data being corrupted by visiting a website on the
Internet.

Claar, 2011

PSU4

Me downloading a file that is infected with a virus
through my email.

Claar, 2011
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Perceived Threat

Please indicate the degree you agree or disagree with
the following statements.

PT1

Hackers trying to take over my PC poses a threat to me.

Liang & Xue, 2010

PT2

Cyber attacks are a danger to my computer.

Liang & Xue, 2010

PT3

It is risky to use my computer if it has a virus.

Liang & Xue, 2010

PT4

It is dreadful if my personal information is stolen from
my PC.

Liang & Xue, 2010

Perceived Benefits

How likely do you feel that the following outcomes will
occur?

BEN1

Avoiding suspicious email attachments will help
prevent my computer from being infected by a virus.

Ng et al., 2009

BEN2

Checking that I am on a secure website before logging
on will help me avoid problems when accessing the
Internet.

Hazari et al., 2008

BEN3

Properly setting my browser security/privacy settings
would be useful in preventing malicious attacks.

Liang & Xue, 2010

BEN4

Not clicking on a link in an email from an unknown
source will prevent me from accessing a malicious
website.

Ng et al., 2009

Perceived Barriers

Please indicate the degree you agree or disagree with
the following statements.

BAR1

Exercising care when reading emails with attachments
would require starting a new habit, which is difficult.

Ng et al., 2009

BAR2

Determining if the websites I visit are secure websites
would be inconvenient.

Ng et al., 2009

BAR3

Configuring the privacy settings on the websites I logon
to would require a considerable amount of effort.

Ng et al., 2009

BAR4

Adding anti-virus and anti-spyware software to my PC
may cause problems for other programs on my PC.

Liang & Xue, 2010

Cues to Action

Please indicate the degree you agree or disagree with
the following statements.

CUE1

If a friend told me of a recent experience with a
malicious email, I would be more conscious of
suspicious emails when reading my emails.

Claar, 2011

CUE2

If I saw a news report, or read in a newspaper or
magazine about a new computer scam, I would be more
concerned about my chances of becoming a victim of
the computer scam.

Claar, 2011

CUE3

If I received information from my computer's vendor or
from the vendor of software installed on my PC that

Claar, 2011
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informed me of a vulnerability, I would be more
concerned about my chances of my computer being
attacked.
CUE4

If my PC started behaving strangely I would be
concerned that my PC was infected by a virus.

Self-Efficacy

Please indicate the degree you agree or disagree with
the following statements.

SE1

I feel confident that I can detect suspicious email
attachments.

Ng et al., 2009

SE2

I feel confident I can handle virus infected files.

Rhee et al. 2009

SE3

I feel confident that I can set my web browser
security/privacy settings.

Rhee et al. 2009

SE4

I feel confident that I can get rid of spyware.

Rhee et al. 2009

Concern for
Privacy

Please indicate the degree you agree or disagree with
the following statements.

CP1

I am concerned that the information I submit to online
companies could be misused.

Son & Kim, 2008

CP2

I am concerned that a person can find private
information about me on the Internet.

Son & Kim, 2008

CP3

I am concerned about providing personal information to
online companies, because of what others might do with
it.

Son & Kim, 2008

CP4

I am concerned about providing personal information to
online companies, because it could be used in a way I
did not foresee.

Son & Kim, 2008

Security Behavior

Please indicate the degree you agree or disagree with
the following statements.

SB1

I do not open attachments in emails from an unknown
source.

Ng et al., 2009

SB2

I have changed the security settings or preferences on
my computer that pertain to my Internet access.

Nyeste, 2011

SB3

I look for a security icon, trust mark, or HTTPS to
verify that a website is secure before logging onto it.

Furman et al., 2012

SB4

I click on links in emails that request me to confirm my
personal details.

Kruger et al., 2010

Security Awareness

Please indicate the degree you agree or disagree with
the following statement.

SA1

I am concerned about information security incidents and
try to take action to prevent them.

Claar, 2011

Mahabi, 2010
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Please indicate the degree to which you are aware or
unaware of the following security topics.
SA2

Spyware

Mahabi, 2010

SA3

Phishing

Mahabi, 2010

SA4

Accessing insecure websites

Mahabi, 2010

SA5

Accessing email attachments

Mahabi, 2010

SA6

Configuring browser security/privacy settings

Mahabi, 2010

Validity and Reliability
Validity
One of the more important forms of validity is the content validity (Straub, Boudreau,
& Gefen, 2004). Content validity is "the degree to which a test measures an intended
content area" (Gay et al. 2009, p. 155). To increase the content validity all questions were
adapted from previous research (Straub et al., 2004).
Straub et al. (2004) considers validating construct validity mandatory. Construct
validity is "The degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from the
operationalizations in your study to the theoretical constructs on which those
operationalizations are made." (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008, p. 56). The convergent and
discriminant validity was assessed to provide support for the construct validity of the
constructs (Angst & Agarwal, 2009; Liang & Xue, 2010; Straub et al., 2004; Trochim &
Donnelly, 2008). Convergent validity is "the degree to which concepts that should be
related theoretically are interrelated in reality." (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008, p .68).
Discriminant validity is "the degree to which concepts that should not be related
theoretically are, in fact, not interrelated in reality." (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008, p. 68).
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Factor analysis was used to assess the convergent validity (Straub et al., 2004;
Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). Although demonstrating convergent validity shows support
for construct validity, it cannot guarantee it (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). In addition,
factor analysis does not eliminate method bias (Straub et al., 2004).
Another method used to increase the statistical conclusion validity is increasing the
statistical power. Statistical power is "The probability of correctly concluding that there is
a treatment or program effect in your data." (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008, p. 23).
Increasing the sample size can increase the statistical power (Trochim & Donnelly,
2008). SurveyMonkey provided 267 participants yielding a statistical power of .90, which
surpasses the required statistical power of .80 (Rovai et al., 2014). See the Sample Size
section for a description on how the statistical power was calculated.

Reliability
The internal consistency reliability of the survey was assessed using Cronbach's alpha
(Gay et al., 2009; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). Internal consistency reliability is "the
extent to which items in a single test are consistent among themselves and with the test as
a whole." (Gay et al., 2009, p. 160). Unlike convergent validity, which looks at how the
individual items of a construct correlate with each other, Cronbach’s alpha uses the splithalf reliability to measure the internal consistency reliability (Trochim & Donnelly,
2008).
The split-half reliability formula randomly divides all items used to measure the
construct into two sets. The total score for each randomly divided set is calculated. The
split-half reliability is the correlation between these two total scores. Cronbach's Alpha is
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the average of all possible split-half scores. In practice, researchers use an equivalent
mathematical shortcut to calculate the average of all possible split-half scores (Trochim
& Donnelly, 2008).
Cronbach's alpha is a good choice for determining internal consistency reliability
when the researchers use Likert scale questions in the survey instrument (Gay et al.,
2009). The Cronbach's alpha for internal consistency reliability in confirmatory research
should be at least .70 (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000; Straub et al., 2004; Thompson,
Barclay, & Higgins, 1995). Therefore, the lower limit for Cronbach's alpha is .70 for
internal consistency reliability of the items in the constructs.
To increase the reliability of the data in the survey SurveyMonkey administered the
survey. The results of the survey were stored in a database on the SurveyMonkey server,
eliminating any transcription errors, which increases the reliability of the data collected
(Kiesler & Sproull, 1986; Roztocki & Lahri, 2003; Stanton, 1998). In addition, an
automated process transferred the data collected by SurveyMonkey into the IBM SPSS
program, eliminating any transcription errors when populating the SPSS database.

Data Collection
SurveyMonkey administered and collected the data for the survey. The survey
consisted of 50 questions (Table 2 and Appendix A) and took the participants
approximately five minutes to complete. The first page of the survey was the informed
consent page, which allowed the participants to opt out of the survey. It described the
purpose of the study. It explained that there were no risks or benefits to the study. It
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informed the participants that the Institutional Review Board approved the study and that
the survey did not collect personally identifiable information.
SurveyMonkey provided the participants for the study. SurveyMonkey randomly
selected the potential participants and contacted them via email. SurveyMonkey donated
$0.50 to the charity of the participant's choice. In addition, SurveyMonkey entered the
participants in their weekly sweepstakes to win $100.

Data Analysis
The unit of analysis for the study was the individual PC user. Survey data was
analyzed using the IBM SPSS program. Demographic data was analyzed using
descriptive statistics. The study made use of tables and charts to display the frequency of
responses and measures of dispersion for demographic questions in the survey. The study
made use of descriptive statistics to summarize the independent variables.
Inferential statistics were used for testing the hypothesis. Multiple regression analysis
was used to measure the strength of the relationships between the different constructs
(Gay et al., 2009; Rovai et al., 2014; Weiers, 2002). Multiple regression analysis is:
A parametric multiple correlation procedure that determines the relationship
between a single continuous DV and multiple continuous IVs. It is also a multiple
regression procedure that accounts for (i.e., predicts) the variance in a continuous
DV (the criterion variable) based on linear combinations of continuous IVs (the
predictor variables). (Rovai et al., 2014, p. 417)
Multiple regression analysis is an excellent analytical tool to use anytime the
relationship between a single dependent variable (DV) and multiple independent
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variables (IV) are studied (Cohen, 1988). Hypotheses testing consisted of running
multiple regression analysis. The following five regression analysis runs were performed
to test the relationships between the constructs.
The first regression tested the relationship between the DV self-efficacy and the IV
security awareness. The second regression tested the relationship between the DV
concern for information privacy and the IV security awareness. The third regression
tested the relationship between the DV expectations and the IV self-efficacy. The fourth
regression tested the relationship between the DV perceived security and the IVs security
awareness, concern for information privacy, perceived susceptibility / perceived severity,
and cues to action. The fifth regression tested the relationship between the DV security
behavior and the IVs expectations, concern for information privacy, and perceived
security.
The following key assumptions were prerequisites for running the multiple regression
analysis (Rovai et al., 2014):


Selection of participants is random to allow for generalization of results to a target
population.



Variables are interval scale variables. Variables have unrestricted variance.



No measurement errors. Measurement errors in the DV may cause weakens the
test of statistical significance. IV measurement errors may lead to bias in the
regression coefficients.



No extreme multicollinearity or singularity should exist. Multicollinearity occurs
when variables very highly correlated and singularity occurs when the variables
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are perfectly correlated. Multicollinearity and singularity indicate redundant
variables exist, which require removal of variables from the analysis.


Normality should exist. Normality is the normal distribution of the disturbance
term for all cases in a sample. The disturbance term is unexplained difference
between the observed values and the predicted values.



No extreme outliers exist. Extreme outliers can have excessive influence on the
regression solution creating misleading results.



The variance of errors is the same across all levels of the IV (homoscedasticity).
Lack of homoscedasticity increases the possibility of a Type I error. It also
decreases the reliability of test statistics, confidence intervals, and the standard
error of the estimate.



The relationship between IVs and the criterion variable is linear. Otherwise, the
true relationship will be underestimated, increasing the change of a Type II error.



There is an adequate sample size.

Scores are significant at p = .05 (Gay et al., 2009; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). The
coefficient of determination (R2) was used to determine how much of the variance is
accounted for by the correlations for the constructs expectations, concern for information
privacy, perceived security threat, and security behavior. The goodness of fit of the model
was measured by using the adjusted coefficient of determination (R2). Cohen (1988)
suggests using the following values to measure the goodness of fit:


Small effect = .0196



Medium effect = .1300



Large effect = .2600
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Summary
The focus of this study was to determine if there is a relationship between a user's
security-awareness and a user's security behavior. The study attempted to answer the
following questions:
1.

Is there a relationship between security-awareness and security behavior for
home computer users?

2.

Is the relationship between security awareness and security behavior
intervened by other factors?

The study examined home computer users' security awareness and behavior in the
context of computer social engineering. The study made use of a survey instrument to
measure a user's security awareness and a user's security behavior. The survey instrument
contained questions on the participants' demographics, security awareness, concern for
information privacy, perceptions of security, and security behavior. The web-based
survey provider SurveyMonkey administered the survey.
Design of the study takes into account validity and reliability threats. All known
threats to validity and reliability were addressed. Multiple regression analysis was used to
analyze the data.
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Chapter 4
Results

Overview
This chapter contains the details for the data analysis and the results of the study. It
includes the analysis of the demographic data. This chapter presents the results of the
reliability and validity tests for the measures of the constructs. It also presents the results
of the hypotheses tests.

Data analysis
Demographics
The research data was collected via an online survey. SurveyMonkey, a web-based
survey provider, administered the survey. SurveyMonkey provided 267 participants for
the study. SurveyMonkey selects participants randomly from a member panel base of
over 30 million people. SurveyMonkey selected participants based on the following
criteria. Every participant must be at least 18 years old and have access to the Internet
from their home computer.
The majority of the participants were female (52%). The youngest participant was 18
years old. The oldest participant was 78 years old. The mean age of the participants was
45 years old. The median age of the participants was 45 years old.
Table 3 contains the frequency table for the demographic questions given in the
survey, Table 4 contains the frequency table for gender, Table 5 contains the frequency
table for age, and Table 6 contains the descriptive statistics for the constructs. Only 28%
of the participants received formal security awareness training. Most of the participants
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(76%) considered themselves proficient or very proficient at using email. Most of the
participants (68%) considered themselves proficient or very proficient at using social
media. Over half of the participants (59%) considered themselves proficient or very
proficient at using word processors. Most of the participants (80%) considered
themselves proficient or very proficient when it comes to online shopping. Most of the
participants (70%) considered themselves proficient at online banking. Only 32% of the
participants reported themselves as proficient or very proficient using programming
languages.
The parametric tests used in this study require the residuals to be approximately
normally distributed (Rovai et al., 2014). Each regression run generated a histogram to
test the normality of the residuals. The histograms showed that the standardized residuals
appear to be approximately normally distributed. Each histogram shows the mean and
standard deviation values. As required, all mean values are approximately zero and all
standard deviation values are approximately one (The histograms are in Appendix D).
The normal probability plots created show the points aligning along the diagonal line,
indicating that the residuals are normally distributed. Since regression analysis is robust
to deviations from normality the points need not be perfectly aligned (Rovai et al., 2014).
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Table 3. Frequency Table
Task
Not
Proficient
Freq.
%
Emailing
14
5.6
Social Media 29
11.6
Word
41
16.5
Processors
Shopping
15
6
Online
Banking
41
16.5
Online
Programming 98
39.4

Somewhat
Proficient
Freq.
%
46
18.5
50
20.1
61
24.5

Proficient
Freq.
%
75
30.1
87
34.9
84
33.7

Very
Proficient
Freq.
%
114
45.8
83
33.3
63
25.3

36

14.5

86

34.5

112

45.0

34

13.7

78

31.3

96

38.6

72

28.9

60

24.1

19

7.6

Table 4. Frequency Table - Gender
Gender

Male
Female
Total

Frequency Percent
120
48.2
129
51.8
262
100.0

Valid
Percent
48.2
51.8
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
48.2
100.0

Valid
Percent
4.4
16.5
18.1
18.9
20.9
17.7
3.6
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
4.2
20.9
39.0
57.8
78.7
96.4
100.0

Table 5. Frequency Table - Age
Age Range

118-19
820-29
-30-39
140-49
950-59
60-69
70-79
Total

Frequency
11
41
45
47
52
44
9
249

Percent
4.4
16.5
18.1
18.9
20.9
17.7
3.6
100.0
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics
Std.
N

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Deviation

Skewness

Kurtosis

Std.
Statistic
Security

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Statistic

Stat.

Err.

Std.
Stat.

Err.

249

1.00

4.00

3.1526

.69061

-.741 .154

.434 .307

Self-Efficacy

249

1.00

5.00

3.5221

.80448

-.245 .154

-.167 .307

Concern For

249

1.00

5.00

3.7319

.74438

-.298 .154

-.032 .307

-2.25

4.00

1.3122

1.33733

.208 .154

-.612 .307

1.00

5.00

3.2013

.81084

-.488 .154

.162 .307

Awareness

Privacy
Expectations

249

Perceived_Severity

249

/Susceptibility
Perceived Threat

249

1.00

5.00

3.7751

.85024

-.632 .154

.382 .307

Cues To Action

249

1.00

5.00

3.7932

.74555

-.788 .154

1.486 .307

Security Behavior

249

1.00

5.00

3.7932

1.11731

-.752 .154

-.361 .307

Reliability and Validity Testing
The next three sub-sections present the results of the data analysis of the self-reported
instruments. The data analysis was used to determine the adequacy of questions used in
formulating the constructs found in the research model. The results for the tests of
internal consistency reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity are reported
in the following sub-sections. Cronbach’s alpha was used to test internal consistency
reliability and factor analysis was used to test convergent and discriminant validity.
Establishing reliability and validity of the items used in the constructs is required before
testing the hypotheses.
The research model contains nine independent variables, three control variables, and
the dependent variable. The independent variables in the research model include
perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, perceived severity threat, expectations
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(perceived benefits and perceived barriers), cues to action, security awareness, selfefficacy in information systems, and concern for information privacy. The control
variables include age, gender, and online shopping. The dependent variable is intent to
perform good security behavior.

Reliability
Reliability refers to the degree to which a measure is consistent (Rovai et al., 2014;
Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). It is the extent an instrument will yield the same results
when administered at different times, different locations, or to different groups assuming
the instrument has not changed (Rovai et al., 2014; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). The
internal consistency reliability “refers to the ability of each item on an instrument to
measure a single construct or dimension” (Rovai et al., 2014, p. 345). The internal
consistency reliability of data was assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha (Gay et al., 2009;
Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). Cronbach’s Alpha measures the extent to which instrument
items correlate highly with each other (Rovai et al., 2014).
The Cronbach’s Alpha for the four original questions for security behavior construct
was .343. Dropping questions 41 and 43 increased the reliability of the security behavior
construct. After dropping the questions, the Cronbach’s alpha increased to .800 (Table 8).
The Cronbach’s alpha for the six original questions for the security awareness construct
was .886. After dropping question 45, Cronbach’s alpha increased to .907. All constructs
exceeded the threshold of .70 (Nunnally, 1978). See Table 8.
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Validity
The method used to assess the convergent and discriminant validity was Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation (Straub et al., 2004; Trochim &
Donnelly, 2008). The correlation matrix produced by the PCA reveals that items for each
construct is highly correlated, supporting convergent validity (Trochim & Donnelly,
2008). In addition, the correlation matrix reveals that the items for each construct are not
highly correlated with items from other constructs, supporting discriminant validity.

Factor Analysis
The method used to determine if the variables group into factors that match the
constructs in the research model was Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with varimax
rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO), for all
variables combined (Table 7), was .865 indicating the data is likely to factor well (Rovai
et al., 2014). In addition, the KMO for all of the individual variables were above .754
providing additional support for adequacy of sampling (Appendix C5). Table 8 includes a
summary of the factor loadings and item-total correlation ranges for the constructs. The
cutoff value for the rotated factor loadings was .50 (Straub, 1989).
In principal component analysis, communality is the percent of variance in a variable
explained by all other factors. The closer the communality is to one the better, with .50%
being the minimum (Rovai et al., 2014). All communalities were good. The highest
communality accounted for 87.3% of the variance in the nine factors (Appendix C.3) and
the lowest communality accounting for 68.7% of the variance. All variables correlated
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strongly with at least one other variable in the Correlation Matrix table (r ≥ 0.3)
indicating that is no need to eliminate any variables (Appendix C.4).
The results of the PCA show eight components having eigenvalues greater than one,
which have a cumulative variance of 74.331%. Based on the Kaiser criterion (Rovai et
al., 2014), only the eight components that had eigenvalues greater than one should be
retained. The All variables (q0017 – q0020 and q0029 – q0032 in Appendix C.2) for the
constructs of perceived threat and ques to action loaded on the same factor. Although the
variables for perceived threat and ques to action loaded on the same factor, it sometimes
makes more sense to use theory rather than statistical results to determine the number of
factors to use (Rovai et al., 2014). Questions q0017 – q0020 (Appendix C.2) represent the
perceived threat construct and q0029 – q0032 (Appendix C.2) represent the ques to action
construct. Therefore, is makes more sense to keep perceived threat and ques to action as
separate constructs instead of combining them into a single construct, as suggested by the
Rotated Component Matrix (Table C.2 – Component 7).

Table 7. KMO
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling
Adequacy.
Bartlett's Test of
Approx. Chi-Square
Sphericity
df
Sig.

.865
7360.179
666
.000
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Table 8. Reliability and Factor Loadings
Construct
Number Cronbach’s
of
Alpha
Items
Severity
4
.920
Susceptibility
4
.894
Threat
4
.873
Benefits
4
.908
Barriers
4
.885
Cues to
4
.846
Action
Self-Efficacy
4
.886
Concern for
4
.889
Privacy
Security
5
.907
Awareness
Security
2
.800
Behavior

Factor
Loading
Range
.881 - .933
.860 - .881
.829 - .881
.870 - .905
.821 - .902
.794 - 852

Item-Total
Correlation
Range
.798 - .872
.751 - .783
.694 - .776
.769 - .823
.690 - .809
.636 - .720

.825 - .906
.833 - .913

.697 - .820
.709 - .830

.808 - .884

.703 - .806

.912 - .912

.663 - .663
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Hypotheses Test Results
Regression Analysis
This research used multiple regression analysis to determine the overall fit of the
model and the relative contribution of each of the independent variables to the total
variance explained. Ascertaining the overall fit of the research model involved executing
five regression runs. Each regression run consisted of one dependent variable, and one or
more independent variables. The following key assumptions were prerequisites for
running the multiple regression analysis (Rovai et al., 2014):


Independence of errors (residuals).



A linear relationship between the predictor variables (and composite) and
the dependent variable.



Homoscedasticity of residuals (equal error variances).



No multicollinearity.



No significant outliers or influential points.



Errors (residuals) are normally distributed.

Casewise Diagnostics were run to detect any outliners. An outlier is “an observation
point that is distant from other observations” (Outlier, 2015, October 17). On a graph, the
outliners are points on the y-axis. Outliners will show as a standardized residual greater
than ±3 standard deviations. Each regression analysis run created Casewise Diagnostics.
The Casewise Diagnostics from the regression runs revealed eighteen outliners: cases 2,
8, 10, 16, 28, 32, 48, 54, 60, 63, 64, 97, 130, 163, 264, 265, 266, and 267. Eliminating the
cases required rerunning all of the regression analysis to ensure consistent results. The
leverage points were checked by looking at the leverage values generated by the
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regression runs. Leverage points are “a measure of how far away the independent
variable values of an observation are from those of the other observations” (Leverage
(statistics), 2015, August 13). Leverage points can be considered as outliners on the xaxis of a graph. All leverage values were less than 0.2, considered in the "safe" range
(Rovai et al., 2014). All Cook's distance values generated by the regression runs were in
the acceptable range, less than one (Rovai et al., 2014).
There was independence of residuals, as assessed by the Durbin-Watson statistics in
the regression analysis runs. The Durbin-Watson statistics should be between 1.5 and 2.5
(Rovai et al., 2014). As shown in Table 9, the Durbin-Watson values in the regression
analysis runs were within the range, indicating that there was no correlation between
residuals (Rovai et al., 2014).

Table 9. Durbin-Watson Summary
Regression
Dependent
Analysis Run Variable
1
SelfEfficacy
2
ConcernForPrivacy
3
Expectations
4
PerceivedThreat

5

Security Behavior

Independent Variables

DurbinWatson
SecurityAwareness
2.085
SecurityAwareness
1.994
SelfEfficacy
1.871
Perceived_Severity/Susceptibility, 2.161
SecurityAwareness,
ConcernForPrivacy,
CuesToAction
PerceivedThreat, Expectations,
2.029
ConcernForPrivacy

To perform multiple linear regressions the independent variables collectively should
be linearly related to the dependent variable and that each independent variable should be
linearly related to the dependent variable. Appendix D contains the graphs showing the
linear relationships of the dependent variables and the independent variables for each
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regression run. The studentized residuals plotted against the unstandardized predicted
values, for all regression runs, show a linear relationship. All partial regression plots
generated in the regression runs show a linear relationship between each independent
variable and the dependent variable.
The plots used for testing for linearity were used to test homoscedasticity. For
homoscedasticity to exist, the residuals will spread over the predicted values of the
dependent variable (Rovai et al., 2014). The plots (the studentized residuals plotted
against the unstandardized predicted values) show that there was no violation of the
assumption of homoscedasticity.
The variance inflation factor (VIF) was used to determine the presence or absence of
multicollinearity (Rovai et al., 2014). A VIF greater than four requires further
investigation (Rovai et al., 2014) and a VIF greater than ten indicates serious
multicollinearity (Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Neter, 2004). The highest VIF is 1.505
indicating all VIFs are in the acceptable range (Tables 11 - 15). In addition, none of the
independent variables had correlations greater than 0.7, indicating there were no major
problems with multicollinearity in the data set (Rovai et al., 2014).

Hypotheses Testing
This study used 0.05 as the level of significance for testing the hypotheses. Tables 11
through 15 summarize the results of the regression analysis runs. Regression analysis
results support hypotheses 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 (Table 10). The regression analysis results
do not support hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 10 (Table 10).
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The control variables used in the study were age, gender, and online shopping. The
gender variable was re-coded using male as one and female as zero. The age variable
represents the actual age of the respondent. SurveyMonkey supplied the gender and age
of the respondents.

Table 10. Hypotheses Testing Summary
Hypothesis Standardized
Sig
Supported
β
H1
0.630
<.001
Yes
H2
0.142
.125
No
H3
0.064
.193
No
H4
0.122
.062
No
H5
-0.123
.039
Yes
H6
0.151
.003
Yes
H7
0.490
<.001
Yes
H8
0.287
<.001
Yes
H9
0.523
<.001
Yes
H10
-0.063
.305
No

Security awareness significantly influences self-efficacy in information security
(𝛽=.630, p < .001), supporting Hypothesis 1 (Table 11). Security awareness's effect on
self-efficacy in information security was high, explaining 42% of the variance (Adj. R2 =
.420). Security awareness did not have a significant influence on concern for information
privacy (𝛽=.142, p = .125). Therefore, the results do not support Hypothesis 2 (Table 12).
Hypothesis 3 is not supported as security awareness does not significantly influence
perceived security threat (𝛽=.064, p = .193). See Table 14.
Self-efficacy in information security does not significantly influence expectations
(𝛽=.122, p = .062). Therefore, the results do not support Hypothesis 4. See Table 13.
Self-efficacy in information security shows a small effect on concern for information
privacy, explaining 12% of the variance (Adj. r2 = .119). Although the significance level
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is above the cutoff of p ≤ .05, it is close at p = .062, indicating a weak level of
significance.
The security awareness, perceived susceptibility/severity, concern for information
privacy, and cues to action constructs' effect on perceived security threat was high,
explaining approximately 56% of the variance (Adj. R2 = .559). See Table 14. Concern
for information privacy (𝛽=.151, p = .003), perceived susceptibility/severity (𝛽=.490, p <
.001), and cues to action (𝛽=.287, p < .001) significantly influences perceived security
threat, supporting Hypotheses 6, 7, and 8.
The expectations, concern for information privacy, and perceived security threat
constructs' effect on security behavior was high, explaining approximately 35% of the
variance (Adj. R2 = .352). See Table 15. Expectations significantly influences security
behavior (𝛽=.523, p < .001), supporting Hypothesis 9. Hypothesis 5 is supported as
concern for information privacy significantly influences security behavior (𝛽= -.123, p =
.039). Hypothesis 10 is not supported as perceived security threat does not significantly
influence security behavior (𝛽=-.063, p = .305).

Table 11. Results of Regression Analysis Run 1
DV - Self-Efficacy
IV
Standardized
Sig
VIF Supported
β
Awareness
0.630
<.001 1.000 H1: Yes
Age
-0.079
.107 1.026
Online
0.106
.058 1.321
Shopping
Gender
-0.121
.013 1.001
Adj. R2
F
N

.420
F(4,244) =45.818, p <.001
249
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Table 12. Results of Regression Analysis Run 2
DV - Concern for information privacy
IV
Standardized Sig VIF
Supported
β
Awareness 0.142
.125 1.000 H2: No
Age
-0.079
.098 1.026
Online
0.106
.044 1.321
Shopping
Gender
-0.121
.020 1.001
Adj. R2
F
N

.015
F(4,244) =1.940, p = .104
249

Table 13. Results of Regression Analysis Run 3
DV - Expectations
IV
Standardized Sig VIF
Supported
β
Self0.122
.062 1.203 H4: No
Efficacy
Age
0.230
<.001 1.005
Online
0.206
.002 1.190
Shopping
Gender
0.113
.063 1.018
Adj. R2
F
N

.119
F(4,244) =9.409, p < .001
249
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Table 14. Results of Regression Analysis Run 4
DV - Perceived security threat
IV
Standardized Sig
VIF
β
Security
0.064
.193 1.359
Awareness
Perceived
0.490
<.001 1.261
Susceptibility/
Severity
Concern for
0.151
.003 1.442
Information
Privacy
Cues to
0.287
<.001 1.531
Action
Age
0.007
.868 1.056
Online
-0.051
.300 1.352
Shopping
Gender
0.086
.043 1.005
Adj. R2
F
N

Supported
H3: No
H7: Yes

H6: Yes

H8: Yes

.559
F(7,241) = 45.854, p < 0.001
249

Table 15. Results of Regression Analysis Run 5
DV - Security behavior
IV
Standardized Sig
VIF Supported
β
Expectations
0.523
<.001 1.226 H9: Yes
Concern for
-0.123
0.039 1.339 H5: Yes
Information
Privacy
Perceived
-0.063
0.305 1.443 H10: No
Security
Threat
Age
0.212
<.001 1.077
Online
-0.023
0.664 1.087
Shopping
Gender
0.079
0.128 1.016
Adj. R2
F
N

.352
F(6,242) = 23.411, p < 0.001
249
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Additional Regression Run
After the analysis of the five regression runs, a sixth regression run (Table 16) was
executed. The purpose of the additional regression run was to answer the first research
question, is there a relationship between security-awareness and security behavior for
home computer users. In addition, the sixth regression run was used to determine if
perceived severity or perceived susceptibility influenced security behavior.
Perceived security threat did not have a significant effect on security behavior.
Perceived severity and perceived susceptibility had a significant effect on perceived
security threat. In addition, Claar (2011) and Ng et al. (2009) found perceived
susceptibility had a significant effect on a user’s security behavior. Therefore perceived
severity and perceived susceptibility were added to the sixth regression run to determine
if one of those constructs had an effect on security behavior.
The fifth regression run provided the base for the sixth regression run. Perceived
threat was removed since it did not have a significant effect on security behavior in the
fifth regression run. Security awareness, perceived susceptibility, and perceived severity
were added as independent variables to the sixth regression run. The results show that the
adjusted R2 increased from .352 to .359. Concern for information privacy had a
significant effect on security behavior (𝛽=-0.126, p = .024). Perceived susceptibility also
had a significant effect on security behavior (𝛽=-0.141, p = .016). Security awareness did
not have a significant effect on security behavior (𝛽=-0.001, p = .989) nor did perceived
severity (𝛽=0.062, p = .306)
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Table 16. Results of regression analysis run 6
DV - Security behavior
IV
Standardized
Sig
VIF
β
Expectations
0.472
<.001 1.312
Concern for
-0.126
.024 1.183
Information
Privacy
Perceived
0.062
.306 1.391
Severity
Perceived
-0.141
.016 1.305
Susceptibility
Security
0.001
.989 1.415
Awareness
Age
0.219
<.001 1.089
Online
-0.030
.617 1.381
Shopping
Gender
0.074
.151 1.013
Adj. R2
F
N

.359
F(8,240) = 18.375, p < 0.001
249

Summary
In chapter 4, the results of all data analysis performed in order to answer the research
questions for this study are presented. Six of the ten hypotheses are supported in this
study.
After dropping two of the security behavior questions and one of the security
awareness questions the all Cronbach’s alphas exceeded the internal consistency
reliability threshold of .70. Casewise diagnostics revealed eighteen outliners, which
required deletion. The data sampling was adequate. The factor loading range for the
constructs and the item-total correlation ranges were acceptable. There was no violation
of the assumption of homoscedasticity and no major problems with multicollinearity. The
standardized residuals were approximately normally distributed.
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The control variables used in the study were age, gender, and online shopping.
Regression analysis results supported hypotheses 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Regression analysis
results did not support hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 10.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Conclusions
The first research question asked if there is a relationship between security-awareness
and security behavior for home computer users. Adding security awareness as an IV to
regression analysis run 5 shows that security awareness does not significantly affect a
user’s security behavior (Table 16). Therefore, security awareness does not have a direct
effect on a person's security behavior. Yet 70% of the survey participants answered agree
or highly agree to the question “I am concerned about information security incidents and
try to take action to prevent them.” This indicates that it is not security awareness that
influences a person’s intent to perform good security behavior but other factors. As
regression analysis run 6 shows expectations, concern for information privacy (CFIP),
and perceived susceptibility have an influence on a person’s intent to perform good
security behavior.
The second research question asked if the relationship between security awareness and
security behavior is intervened by other factors. Security awareness does have a large
effect on self-efficacy. However, self-efficacy was the only construct that security
awareness influenced. As expected, security awareness did not have a direct effect on
security behaviors. Security awareness’ insignificant effect on CFIP was unexpected. One
plausible explanation is that a person’s concern for information privacy outweighs
possible security threats. Users may be afraid to secure their PC if it means giving up
sensitive personal information. Security awareness did not have a significant influence on
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a person’s threat perception. Apparently, users’ security awareness does not influence
what they consider a perceived security threat. It is not the users’ security awareness that
counts, but what they think is a threat, whether the threat is real or perceived. Users do
consider their perceived susceptibility to a threat and the perceived severity of a threat,
when deciding on whether to take action on a perceived threat.
Cues to action had a significant effect on a person’s threat perception, which was
expected. Often times the cue is from a reliable public source or from a trusted friend or
family member. The users may act upon the cue just because they think others are doing
the same or the users may act upon the cue to impress or please the person that suggested
the action. This suggests that subjective norm may play a role in a user considering a
security incident as a threat.
In this study, perceived threat did not have a significant effect on a user’s security
behavior. Liang and Xue (2010) found the perceived threat had an effect on avoidance
motivation, but did not test its effect on avoidance behavior. Neither Claar (2011) nor Ng
et al. (2009) found perceived severity to have a significant effect on a user’s security
behavior. However, both researchers found perceived susceptibility had a significant
effect on a user’s security behavior. After replacing perceived threat with perceived
severity and perceived susceptibility in regression run 6 (Table 16), it was found that
perceived susceptibility has a significant effect on a user’s security behavior but
perceived severity did not. Unlike the HBM, in which perceived threat influences health
related behaviors, in the Security Belief Model (SBM) only perceived susceptibility
influences security related behaviors. This makes sense since perceived susceptibility is
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one of the most important predictors in the HBM and perceived severity is the least
powerful predictor (Glanz et. al., 2008).
CFIP was another construct added to the SBM that was not in the HBM. As expected,
CFIP has a significant effect on perceived security threat. Users’ concern for privacy
influences their perception of risk when dealing with online merchants. Users who have a
concern for their privacy believe that online companies tend to misuse their personal
information. This mistrust would raise a user’s threat perception when dealing with any
online merchant requesting personal information.
CFIP also has a significant effect on a user’s security behavior. Its effect is negative
indicating users will have a tendency not to perform secure behavior when they feel their
privacy threatened. Its negative effect was expected. Individuals' concern for privacy
influences their decision to allow storing of their information on electronic media (Angst
& Agarwal, 2009; Dinev & Hart, 2005) and their intention to make online purchases (Li
et al., 2008). Users’ CFIP may prevent them from loading security software because they
do not want to provide personal information to the software company or allow the
company to make automatic updates to their PC.
Expectations was the most powerful predictor of security behavior (𝛽=.523, p < .001).
This was expected. In the HBM perceived barriers is the most powerful predictor of
intent to take action and perceived benefits is considered one of the most important
predictors.
Self-efficacy does not have a significant effect on expectations using the standard p =
.05. However it is close at p = .062. Therefore, it only has a weak level of significance. It
is surprising that self-efficacy did not have a greater effect. It would seem that users with
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high SEIS would realize the benefits of practicing good security behavior. In addition,
high SEIS should help users overcome barriers in practicing good security behavior.
Claar (2011) and Ng et al. (2009) found that self-efficacy had an effect on security
behavior, indicating that self-efficacy’s effect is stronger on security behaviors than on
expectations.
In summary, the findings of this study indicate that most home computer users are
security aware, at least in the context of computer social engineering. Security awareness
does not have a direct effect on a user’s security behavior and only influences selfefficacy in the research model. CFIP influences perceived threat and security behavior.
Perceived susceptibility has an effect on a user’s security behavior, but perceived severity
and perceived threat does not. Expectations were the most powerful predictor of security
behavior in the research model.

Study Limitations
SurveyMonkey provided the participants for the study. These participants are part of
SurveyMonkey’s pool of survey takers, many who take surveys on a regular basis. In
addition, this was a long survey, consisting of 50 questions. Due to these factors, some
participants may have answered some questions without giving the questions much
thought. This would explain why the average time to complete the survey was only five
minutes. The survey was also subject to self-selection and self-reporting bias (Nunnally,
1978; Rea & Parker, 2005).
Future studies should attempt to control for these potential problems. Observational
studies could control for self-reporting bias. In addition, creating shorter survey

81
instruments could minimize participants’ tendency to answer questions without giving the
questions much thought.
The advantage of using SurveyMonkey is SurveyMonkey’s large pool of potential
survey respondents to use in the selection process. In addition, SurveyMonkey selected
the participants randomly (Rea & Parker, 2005). SurveyMonkey provided the survey
results in a format that allowed direct transfer of the results into SPSS, eliminating any
possibility of transcription errors. The survey design required participants to answer all
questions, eliminating the possibility of missing data.
Another limitation of the study is it only covered security awareness as it pertains to
computer social engineering. There are other factors relating to security awareness such
as malware (Yoshikai et al., 2011), email (Ng et al., 2009), spyware (Liang & Xue,
2010), and security software usage. Duplicating this study using other security awareness
factors would help verify the correctness of this study’s results.
Dropping two of the four original questions for the security behavior construct
increased internal consistency reliability of the construct. However, two questions may
not be enough to represent the construct. Future studies should use more than two
questions to ensure that the questions are more representative of the construct.

Implications
This study contributes to the body of knowledge in the IS security domain. It
demonstrates that security awareness does influence self-efficacy. Several researchers
have performed studies on security behavior (Furnell et al., 2007; Grant, 2010; Katz,
2006; North et al., 2010). This study extends those studies by including security
awareness and CFIP in the SBM.
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Researchers (Claar, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng et al., 2009) have performed studies
on security behavior using the Health Belief Model (HBM) as a basis for their research
model. Adding security awareness and CFIP to the SBM enhances the model by
increasing its explanatory power. This study helps validate what previous studies have
shown, that the SBM helps explain the security behavior of computers users. Although
this study used home computer users as subjects it should generalize to corporate users as
previous studies used a SBM in corporate environments.
This study also has implications for practical applications. It demonstrates that
security awareness influences self-efficacy, which in turn influences expectations.
Increasing one’s self-efficacy should increase one’s perceived benefit of performing good
security behavior. This study also demonstrates that CFIP directly effects security
behavior. Finding ways to alleviate one’s privacy concerns could increase that person’s
tendency to perform good security behavior. The study showed that perceived
susceptibility has an effect on a user’s security behavior. Practitioners can enhance
security training to include more information on how users are susceptible to security
incidents, including but not limited to malware, Trojans, phishing, and malicious website
sites.

Recommendations
This study was designed to determine if security awareness affected a user’s security
behavior. The study shows that security awareness does not influence security behavior
however; it does effect self-efficacy. The study looked at the participants' security
behavior in the context of computer social engineering. Researchers should perform more
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studies to determine if the research model extends to other types of security activities,
such as response to malware, security software installation, security software
configuration, email, website access, file sharing, and password selection.
This study showed that perceived susceptibility is a better indicator of security
behavior than perceived threat. Therefore, future research should drop the perceived
threat construct from the research model. This research was not the only research
conducted that showed perceived susceptibility had a significant effect on security
behavior. Research conducted by Ng et al. (2009) and Claar (2011) also showed
perceived susceptibility had a significant effect on security behavior. Therefore, future
research should include perceived susceptibility as a determinant to security behavior.
The HBM researchers have found that demographic, socio-psychological, and
structural variables have an indirect influence on health related behavior (Glanz et al.,
2008; Hayden, 2009). This study used age, gender, and on-line shopping as control
variables. Other researchers have used variables as control or moderating variables in
their security behavioral research (Claar, 2011; Ng et al., 2009). Future research should
include variables such as job function, education, and internet experience to determine
how the variables affect the model.
The subjective norm construct has shown to influence a person’s intent to perform the
behavior under study (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Mathieson, 1991; Taylor &
Todd, 1995). Subjective norm is “the person’s perception that most people who are
important to him think he should or should nor perform the behavior in question”
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 302). Anderson and Agarwal (2010) used the subjective
norm construct in their Individual Security Motivation model. Subjective norm
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influenced a person’s intent to perform security-related behavior in the Anderson and
Agarwal (2010) model. In future studies, researchers could add the subjective norm
construct to the research model to see if it could explain more of the variance in a user’s
security behavior.

Summary
Attacks on computer systems continue to be a problem in both business and personal
computing environments. Malware and phishing attacks are on the increase (AntiPhishing Working Group, 2015), affecting millions of users and costing businesses and
consumers billions of dollars (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2015). Much of the
malware designed today use social engineering techniques, which allows the attackers to
bypass the technical safeguards put in place by security software (Anti-Phishing Working
Group, 2011; Carroll, 2006). Home computer users need to be aware of these attacks and
learn how to protect themselves from them (Kritzinger & von Solms, 2010).
The goal of this study was to determine how security aware home computer users are
and if there is any relationship between security awareness and home computer users'
security behavior. The research questions investigated were:
RQ1: Is there a relationship between home computer users’ security-awareness
and security behavior?
RQ2: Is the relationship between security awareness and security behavior
intervened by other factors?

Hochbaum (1958) developed the HBM to study the behaviors of people in health
related studies. The HBM consists of eight constructs (Hayden, 2009): perceived severity,
perceived susceptibility, perceived threat, perceived benefits, perceived barriers, cues to
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action, self-efficacy, and modifying variables. Previous researchers have used modified
versions of the HBM to study security behavior (Claar, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng et
al., 2009). Claar (2011) and Ng et al. (2010) created research models that studied the
direct effect of the HBM constructs on security behavior. Liang & Xue’s (2010) research
model followed the format of the HBM. Liang & Xue (2010) used perceived severity and
perceived susceptibility as antecedents to perceived threat. The model has perceived
threat, perceived benefits, perceived barriers, and self-efficacy as influencing security
behavior intent.
The research model used a modified version of the HBM to determine if there is a
relationship between security awareness and a person's intent to perform good security
behavior. The research model contains two constructs not contained in the HBM: security
awareness and concern for information privacy (CFIP). The study analyzed the influence
security awareness has on self-efficacy, concern for information privacy, and perceived
threat. The study analyzed the influence self-efficacy has on expectations. The study also
analyzed the influence CFIP has on security behavior.
Security awareness was the focus of this study. The study examined the home
computer user’s security awareness and behavior in the context of computer social
engineering. This study analyzed the effects security awareness had on the other
constructs in the research model. The study made use of a survey instrument to measure a
user's security awareness and a user's security behavior, along with a user’s perceived
severity, perceived susceptibility, perceived threat, expectations, cues to action, and selfefficacy. The web-based survey provider SurveyMonkey administered the survey.
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The findings of this study indicate that for the most part, home computer users are
security aware. Security awareness does not have a direct effect on a user’s security
behavior. However, it does have influence on self-efficacy. CFIP has a direct effect on
security behavior. Perceived susceptibility has a direct effect on a user’s security
behavior, but perceived severity or perceived threat does not.
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Appendix C
Factor analysis

C.1 Total Variance Explained

Extraction Sums of Squared

Rotation Sums of Squared

Loadings

Loadings

% of

% of

Initial Eigenvalues
% of

Cumulative

Total Variance

Cumulative
%

Total Variance

Cumulative

Component

Total Variance

%

%

1

10.423

28.170

28.170 10.423

28.170

28.170 4.196

11.341

11.341

2

5.518

14.913

43.082

5.518

14.913

43.082 3.955

10.690

22.032

3

3.507

9.478

52.560

3.507

9.478

52.560 3.478

9.400

31.432

4

2.349

6.350

58.910

2.349

6.350

58.910 3.417

9.234

40.666

5

1.880

5.082

63.992

1.880

5.082

63.992 3.333

9.008

49.674

6

1.514

4.092

68.084

1.514

4.092

68.084 3.286

8.880

58.554

7

1.238

3.347

71.430

1.238

3.347

71.430 3.256

8.800

67.354

8

1.073

2.901

74.331

1.073

2.901

74.331 2.582

6.978

74.331

9

.824

2.227

76.558

10

.699

1.890

78.447

11

.628

1.696

80.144

12

.569

1.539

81.682

13

.545

1.473

83.155

14

.503

1.360

84.516

15

.452

1.221

85.737

16

.441

1.192

86.929

17

.423

1.143

88.073

18

.382

1.031

89.104

19

.363

.980

90.084

20

.342

.925

91.009

21

.327

.883

91.891

22

.283

.765

92.656

23

.275

.744

93.401

24

.258

.696

94.097

25

.246

.664

94.761

26

.220

.595

95.356

27

.213

.575

95.931

28

.210

.568

96.499
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29

.194

.525

97.024

30

.179

.484

97.508

31

.167

.451

97.959

32

.160

.432

98.391

33

.159

.428

98.819

34

.141

.381

99.201

35

.105

.285

99.486

36

.101

.272

99.757

37

.090

.243

100.000

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

102
C.2 Rotated Component Matrix

Rotated Component Matrixa
Component
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

.853

.131

.079

-.076

.022

.017

.084

.146

.816

.036

.077

-.158

-.006

.100

.085

.126

q0046 Spyware

.813

.101

.134

-.035

-.039

.099

.113

.188

q0047 Phishing

.783

.064

.046

-.092

-.060

-.001

-.062

.208

.745

.034

.121

-.050

-.028

.114

.073

.324

.145

.874

.206

.039

.142

.071

.095

-.020

.096

.842

.150

.028

.128

.123

.095

-.031

.087

.815

.188

.090

.206

.070

.102

-.029

.049

.788

.294

-.005

.105

.099

.186

-.051

q0048 Accessing
insecure websites
q0049 Accessing
email attachments

q0050 Configuring
browser
security/privacy
settings
q0010 My data being
corrupted by a virus or
a cyber attack.
q0009 My PC being
taken over by a
hacker.
q0012 Downloading a
file that is infected with
a virus through my
email.
q0011 My identity
(card card number,
social security number,
bank account etc.)
being stolen from my
PC from a cyber
attack.
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q0024 Not clicking on
a link in an email from
an unknown source
will prevent me from

.151

.218

.814

-.068

.068

.097

.119

.175

.052

.232

.796

-.067

.077

.142

.189

.172

.153

.266

.754

-.098

.113

.165

.124

.085

.188

.233

.733

.004

.009

.159

.325

.126

-.130

.089

-.085

.842

.112

.034

.084

-.017

-.135

.029

-.053

.829

.146

.121

.100

.081

-.075

.047

.074

.818

.055

.121

-.039

.071

accessing a malicious
website.
q0023 Properly setting
my browser
security/privacy
settings would be
useful in preventing
malicious attacks.
q0021 Avoiding
suspicious email
attachments will help
prevent my computer
from being infected by
a virus.
q0022 Checking that I
am on a secure
website before logging
on will help me avoid
problems when
accessing the Internet.
q0027 Configuring the
privacy settings on the
websites I logon to
would require a
considerable amount
of effort.
q0026 Determining if
the websites I visit are
secure websites would
be inconvenient.
q0028 Adding antivirus and anti-spyware
software to my PC
may cause problems
for other programs on
my PC.
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q0025 Exercising care
when reading emails
with attachments
would require starting

-.058

-.091

-.137

.771

.171

.108

.138

.120

-.031

.122

.043

.182

.840

.081

.064

.039

-.054

.147

.040

.134

.838

.104

.050

.019

-.002

.189

.094

.022

.833

.153

.143

-.050

-.038

.135

.077

.157

.809

.065

.143

-.134

.083

.144

.142

.084

.106

.855

.206

.016

.058

.067

.122

.067

.035

.830

.273

.068

a new habit, which is
difficult.
q0013 My PC being
taken over by a
hacker.
q0014 My identity
(card card number,
social security number,
bank account etc.)
being stolen from my
PC.
q0015 My data being
corrupted by visiting a
website on the
Internet.
q0016 Me
downloading a file that
is infected with a virus
through my email.
q0040 I am concerned
about providing
personal information to
online companies,
because it could be
used in a way I did not
foresee.
q0039 I am concerned
about providing
personal information to
online companies,
because of what
others might do with it.

105

q0037 I am concerned
that the information I
submit to online

.146

.100

.116

.111

.146

.807

.028

.049

.015

.124

.152

.226

.160

.740

.190

-.027

.157

.025

.229

.345

.024

.130

.678

-.033

-.035

.416

.020

-.030

.358

.205

.615

.189

.114

.010

.273

.437

.032

.151

.606

-.152

.042

.381

.217

-.179

.257

.245

.579

.063

.017

.434

.279

-.193

.155

.262

.564

.062

companies could be
misused.
q0038 I am concerned
that a person can find
private information
about me on the
Internet.
q0029 If a friend told
me of a recent
experience with a
malicious email, I
would be more
conscious of
suspicious mails when
reading my emails.
q0018 Cyber attacks
are a danger to my
computer.
q0030 If I saw a news
report, read in a
newspaper, or read in
a magazine about a
new computer scam, I
would be more
concerned about my
chances of becoming
a victim of the
computer scam.
q0019 It is risky to use
my computer if it has a
virus.
q0020 It is dreadful if
my personal
information is stolen
from my PC.
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q0032 If my PC started
behaving strangely I
would be concerned

.120

.174

.391

.112

.096

.339

.547

.035

.160

.047

.461

.326

.071

.194

.542

-.048

-.013

.462

-.008

.038

.298

.217

.531

.238

.344

-.026

.090

.123

-.008

.001

-.023

.826

.390

-.125

.133

.102

-.033

.050

.040

.772

.463

.009

.202

-.017

-.077

.126

.099

.637

.451

.081

.190

.087

-.032

-.032

.012

.636

that my PC was
infected by a virus.
q0031 If I received
information from my
computer's vendor or
from the vendor of
software installed on
my PC that informed
me of a vulnerability, I
would be more
concerned about my
chances of my
computer being
attacked.
q0017 Hackers trying
to take over my PC
poses a threat to me.
q0034 I feel confident I
can handle virus
infected files.
q0036 I feel confident
that I can get rid of
spyware.
q0035 I feel confident
that I can set my web
browser
security/privacy
settings.
q0033 I feel confident
that I can detect
suspicious email
attachments.
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 15 iterations.
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C.3 Communalities

Initial

Extraction

PSE1

1.000

.806

PSE2

1.000

.873

PSE3

1.000

.795

PSE4

1.000

.782

PSU1

1.000

.772

PSU2

1.000

.774

PSU3

1.000

.788

PSU4

1.000

.752

PT1

1.000

.794

PT2

1.000

.838

PT3

1.000

.714

PT4

1.000

.719

BEN1

1.000

.778

BEN2

1.000

.791

BEN3

1.000

.824

BEN4

1.000

.801

BAR1

1.000

.734

BAR2

1.000

.789

BAR3

1.000

.785

BAR4.

1.000

.711

CUE1

1.000

.738

CUE2

1.000

.719

CUE3

1.000

.715

CUE4

1.000

.699

SE1

1.000

.688

SE2

1.000

.847

SE3

1.000

.702

SE4

1.000

.817

CP1

1.000

.734

CP2

1.000

.705

CP3

1.000

.796

CP4

1.000

.841

SA2

1.000

.750

SA3

1.000

.687
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SA4

1.000

.823

SA5

1.000

.743

SA6

1.000

.703

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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C.4 Correlation Matrix Summary

PSE1

Highest
Correlation
.811

PSE2

.811

PSE3

.750

PSE4

.786

PSU1

.755

PSU2

.755

PSU3

.747

PSU4

.747

PT1

.775

PT2

.775

PT3

.743

PT4

.743

BEN1

.703

BEN2

.757

BEN3
BEN4

.757
. 744

BAR1

.706

BAR2

.756

BAR3

.756

BAR4.

. 634

CUE1

.640

CUE2

.640

CUE3

.622

CUE4

.622

SE1

.673

SE2

.806

SE3

.644

SE4

.806

CP1

.689

CP2

.653

CP3

.807

CP4

.807

SA2

.707

Variable
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SA3

.673

SA4

.731

SA5

.731

SA6

. 707
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C.5 Anti-image Correlation Summary

PSE1

KMO
measure
.867

PSE2

.863

PSE3

.915

PSE4

.901

PSU1

.781

PSU2

.798

PSU3

.815

PSU4

.811

PT1

.871

PT2

.864

PT3

.921

PT4

.930

BEN1

.923

BEN2

.903

BEN3
BEN4

.873
.916

BAR1

.795

BAR2

.812

BAR3

.805

BAR4.

.848

CUE1

.868

CUE2

.847

CUE3

.916

CUE4

.916

SE1

.892

SE2

.754

SE3

.909

SE4

.762

CP1

.838

CP2

.892

CP3

.847

CP4

.859

SA2

.869

Variable
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SA3

.847

SA4

.841

SA5

.798

SA6

.924
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Appendix D
Regression Analysis Tables

D.1 Regression Analysis 1

Correlations
Shopping
online
(Buying
products or
services
from an
online
SelfEfficacy SecurityAwareness
Pearson

SelfEfficacy

Correlation

Age

male

merchant)

1.000

.652

.018

.107

.356

SecurityAwareness

.652

1.000

.124

-.031

.423

Age

.018

.124

1.000

-.010

-.016

male

.107

-.031

-.010

1.000

.010

.356

.423

-.016

.010

1.000

.

.000

.389

.047

.000

SecurityAwareness

.000

.

.025

.311

.000

Age

.389

.025

.

.437

.399

male

.047

.311

.437

.

.435

.000

.000

.399

.435

.

SelfEfficacy

249

249

249

249

249

SecurityAwareness

249

249

249

249

249

Age

249

249

249

249

249

male

249

249

249

249

249

Shopping online
(Buying products or
services from an
online merchant)
Sig. (1-tailed)

SelfEfficacy

Shopping online
(Buying products or
services from an
online merchant)
N
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Shopping online
(Buying products or
services from an
online merchant)

249

249

249

249

249

115

116

117

118
D.2 Regression Analysis 2

Correlations
Shopping
online
(Buying
products
or
services
from an
online
ConcernForPrivacy SecurityAwareness

Age

male merchant)

Pearson

ConcernForPrivacy

1.000

.195

.087

-.048

.077

Correlation

SecurityAwareness

.195

1.000

.124

-.031

.423

Age

.087

.124 1.000

-.010

-.016

male

-.048

-.031

-.010 1.000

.010

.077

.423

-.016

.010

1.000

ConcernForPrivacy

.

.001

.085

.226

.112

SecurityAwareness

.001

.

.025

.311

.000

Age

.085

.025

.

.437

.399

male

.226

.311

.437

.

.435

.112

.000

.399

.435

.

ConcernForPrivacy

249

249

249

249

249

SecurityAwareness

249

249

249

249

249

Age

249

249

249

249

249

male

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

Shopping online
(Buying products or
services from an
online merchant)
Sig. (1-tailed)

Shopping online
(Buying products or
services from an
online merchant)
N

Shopping online
(Buying products or
services from an
online merchant)

119

120

121

122
D.3 Regression Analysis 3

Correlations
Shopping
online
(Buying
products or
services
from an
online
PBminusPB SelfEfficacy

Age

male

merchant)

Pearson

Expectations

1.000

.241

.212

-.097

.258

Correlation

SelfEfficacy

.241

1.000

.018

.107

.356

Age

.212

.018

1.000

-.010

-.016

male

-.097

.107

-.010

1.000

.010

.258

.356

-.016

.010

1.000

.

.000

.000

.064

.000

SelfEfficacy

.000

.

.389

.047

.000

Age

.000

.389

.

.437

.399

male

.064

.047

.437

.

.435

.000

.000

.399

.435

.

Expectations

249

249

249

249

249

SelfEfficacy

249

249

249

249

249

Age

249

249

249

249

249

male

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

Shopping online
(Buying products or
services from an online
merchant)
Sig. (1-tailed)

Expectations

Shopping online
(Buying products or
services from an online
merchant)
N

Shopping online
(Buying products or
services from an online
merchant)

123

124

125

126

127

D.4 Regression Analysis 4

Correlations
Sho
ppin

Pear

PerceivedThreat

son

SecurityAwaren

Corre ess

Perceived_

Concern

g

Perceived

SecurityA

Severity_Su

ForPriva

CuesTo

Threat

wareness

sceptibility

cy

Action

onli
Age

male

ne

1.000

.264

.648

.528

.621

.080 -.080 .151

.264

1.000

.139

.195

.223

.124 -.031 .423

.648

.139

1.000

.372

.420

.039 -.021 .147

.528

.195

.372

1.000

.512

.087 -.048 .077

.621

.223

.420

.512

1.000

.080

.124

.039

.087

-.080

-.031

-.021

-.048

.026

-.010

.151

.423

.147

.077

.124

-.016

.

.000

.000

.000

.000

.103

.103 .008

.000

.

.014

.001

.000

.025

.311 .000

.000

.014

.

.000

.000

.272

.372 .010

.000

.001

.000

.

.000

.085

.226 .112

lation Perceived_Seve
rity_Susceptibilit
y
ConcernForPriv
acy
CuesToAction
Age

male

.157

.026 .124

.157 1.000 -.010
1.00
0

.016
.010

Shopping online
(Buying
products or
services from an

.010

1.00
0

online
merchant)
Sig.

PerceivedThreat

(1-

SecurityAwaren

tailed ess
)

Perceived_Seve
rity_Susceptibilit
y
ConcernForPriv
acy
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CuesToAction

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

.007

.340 .026

Age

.103

.025

.272

.085

.007

.

.437 .399

male

.103

.311

.372

.226

.340

.437

. .435

.008

.000

.010

.112

.026

.399

.435

.

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

CuesToAction

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

Age

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

male

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

249

Shopping online
(Buying
products or
services from an
online
merchant)
N

PerceivedThreat
SecurityAwaren
ess
Perceived_Seve
rity_Susceptibilit
y
ConcernForPriv
acy

Shopping online
(Buying
products or
services from an
online
merchant)

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136
D.5 Regression Analysis 5

Correlations

Pearson SecurityBehavi

Expect

ConcernFor

Perceived

viors

ations

Privacy

Threat

Shopping
Age

male

online

1.000

.547

-.109

.003

.312

-.139

.111

.547

1.000

.060

.269

.212

-.097

.258

-.109

.060

1.000

.528

.087

-.048

.077

.003

.269

.528

1.000

.080

-.080

.151

Age

.312

.212

.087

.080 1.000

-.010
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